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SWEDISH REPORT
Eric Clapham*
1. Political Aspects
Sweden joined the EU in 1995 after a referendum in late 1994. At this time, the
Maastricht had already been ratified, and therefore EU membership in principle
implied EMU membership. This was however not discussed during the
campaign proceeding the referendum, more than that the question would be
settled at a later stage, and probably through a further referendum. As a result,
Sweden is at present in the unique position of not having adopted the common
currency, in spite of the fact that Sweden has been able to fulfil the convergence
criteria and is without a formal exemption.
After the intense campaign in 1994, there was relatively little public debate on
EU-related topics during the following year in Sweden. However, the question
of Swedish EMU membership has been the subject of increasing public debate
during the last few years. This debate has primarily concentrated on the purely
economic aspects of adopting the Euro currency, i.e. whether membership
would enhance Sweden’s economic prospects. On the other hand, serious debate
of the institutional set-up of the ECB and the Stability pact has largely been
confined to a narrower group of experts.
1.1 Public Opinion
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When analysing public opinion about the EMU, it should be remembered that
the Swedish population tends to be the most eurosceptic within the EU. Sweden
only recently joined the union, and had earlier taken considerable pride in its
non-alliance.
This general attitude affects also public opinion regarding Swedish EMU
membership. Since 1996, when regular polls began, the fraction of the
population that is against membership has been much larger than the fraction in
favour. However, a substantial part of the population has not expressed an
opinion in polls.
Opinion about EMU membership follows the same kind of socio-economic
pattern as about EU membership. This means that urban dwellers, private sector
employees and white-collar worker tend to be more favourable to membership
than rural dwellers, public sector employees and blue-collar workers.
Swedes do not appear to attach very great sentiments to the domestic currency.
Debate has to a greater extent been focused on whether there is need for
monetary policy to achieve sufficient macroeconomic flexibility and whether
joining the EMU may have effects on other policy areas.
Figure 1: In a referendum on Swedish EMU membership,
would you vote yes or no?
Surveys are based on 1000 interviews. All figures are percentages.
October 1998 December 1998
Yes 39 39
No 44 44
Do not know 17 17
January 1999 May 1999
Yes 45 38
No 38 44
Do not know 17 17
June 1999 October 1999
Yes 36 43
No 46  40
Do not know 18 17
December 1999
Yes 44
No 41
Do not know 15
Source: Sifo Research & Consulting 1999
Figure 2: In a referendum on Swedish EMU membership, would you vote
yes or no?
The survey is based on 1000 interviews during 29 Nov – 2 Dec 1999. All figures
are percentages.
Women Men
Yes 32    56
No 49        33
Do not know 20    10
Private Sector Public Sector
Yes 48 37
No 40 47
Do not know 13 17
Blue collar workers White collar workers
Yes 31 57
No 53 31
Do not know 17 12
Three largest cities Rural areas
Yes 57 33
No 29 52
Do not know 14 15
Source: Sifo Research & Consulting 1999
Figure 3: Which aspects of the EMU-question do you feel is the most
important to discuss? (More than one answer possible)
Survey is based on 1000 interviews during 29 Nov – 2 Dec 1999. All figures are
percentages.
Currency issues, the Euro, monetary policy 14
Business and trade   8
Whether to participate or not   7
National self determination   5
Effects on Sweden   5
Negative to EU/EMU   3
The environment   2
Agriculture, animals   2
Positive to EU/EMU   2
The EU’s relationship with other countries   2
Unemployment, employment   2
Taxes, social security   1
Equality, equity   1
Need for more information   1
National defence   1
A matter of principle: Sweden must join   1
Other   6
Do not know                                                                                           56
Source: Sifo Research & Consulting 1999
After the introduction of the Euro in early 1999, the public opinion became more
favourable to Swedish membership (see figure 1). At this time, polls indicated
not only that those in favour outnumbered those against, but that this was result
was statistically significant as well.
Several factors are likely to have contributed to this swing of opinion during
early 1999. Firstly, as time has passed by the notion of adopting a common
European currency, though appearing strange to many at first, has gradually
become more accepted.  Secondly, the introduction itself appeared very
successful, and received considerable publicity in major mass media. Thirdly, an
increasing number of trade union leaders and politicians expressed support for
Swedish membership.
Nevertheless, many have yet to make up its mind, and swings in pubic opinion
therefore easily occur.  As media attention around the single currency petered
out, and the Euro began to depreciate against major currencies such as the US
dollar, support for the EMU dwindled once again. A low point was reached
during the summer, but thereafter support again rebounded reaching almost the
same level as in early 1999. This process is likely to have been driven primarily
through increasing public support for the EMU among leading politicians.
During the year 2000, support has again decreased, reflecting that a large group
of people have volatile preferences..
The development of EMU support followed roughly the same pattern in Sweden
as in other European countries. Support generally increased in early 1999.
However, the average Europeans has a much more favourable opinion about the
common currency, than the average Swede. While 64% of Europeans approved
according to Eurobarometer 50, the same figure for Swedes was only 45%. The
figure for Sweden was however in line with the average of 44% for the four EU
countries that have not adopted the common currency.
Concerning the Stability Pact it is noteworthy that is has generated very limited
public debate in Sweden. When Sweden approaches a decision on adopting the
single currency it is likely that it will become a topic of greater importance.
Nevertheless, the overall Swedish macroeconomic policy stance has been in line
with that professed by the Pact: consolidation of public finances and promotion of
price stability. Sweden is one of a limited number of European Union member
states with a public sector surplus, though the public budget has previously been
very volatile over the business cycle.
1.2 Transparency and independence of the ECB
In Sweden there has been considerable debate on the transparency of EU
bureaucracy and its decision making process – or perhaps more accurately the
perceived lack of transparency. However, so far this has been used mainly as an
argument against membership in the EU or the EMU, rather than as the starting
point for a debate on the future of EU institutions.
Regarding central bank independence, Sweden itself has during the late 1990s,
implemented considerable reforms. The Swedish central bank, which is the
world’s oldest, has traditionally been firmly within the control of the political
system. Today, its top management is appointed on mainly non-political merits
and for multiple year terms. Also, by law the central bank must have only price
stability as its goal. This reform package has been firmly supported by most
parts of the Swedish establishment and has generally met little resistance. There
have been occasional criticisms, arguing that the central bank should show
greater interest in the unemployment rate and that it is implementing an
unnecessary tight policy. So far, though, this has carried little political weight.
The concept of an independent central bank pursuing the goal of price stability
should be acceptable to Swedes, given that Sweden has already had such a
policy in place since the early 1990s. Nevertheless, it is clear that the
independence of the ECB is considerably more pronounced than that of
Sweden’s central bank. It seems though that this has not greatly affected debate.
1.3 Financial Markets
Swedish financial markets generally responded positively towards both the
lowering of the ECB interest rate in April and the hike in November. Against the
background of lingering effects of the Asia crisis and sluggish European growth,
the April adjustment appeared sensible. The November increase was also
considered reasonable given indications of a build-up of inflationary pressures,
manifested primarily in the faster than expected money growth rate. Villy
Bergström, a member of the Governing Board of the central bank, said that the
cut was helpful as “some of Europe’s growth problem is due to low demand”1.
Liselotte Siewertz, Head of Spintab Markets, a leading housing credit firm, said
in early November that the raise was positive and a sign of the determination of
the ECB to keep inflation stable.
Leading interest rate analysts in Sweden have, however, been critical about the
ECB being unnecessarily vague. The Swedish central bank has during the last
few years adopted an explicit inflation target, and also continuously
communicates its analysis of the economy to the financial markets. This is not
the case with the ECB to quite the same extent, making it more difficult to
analyse understand the ECB’s view on the European economy, it is often
claimed. There has also been some speculation whether the bank is unduly
concerned with the euro’s rate of exchange towards other major currencies, at
the expense of the inflation target.
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Analysts are more convinced that they understand the US Federal Reserve’s
behaviour, even though it has adopted an official inflation target. In this case
however a wealth of earlier research and experience is available to professional
analysts. Obviously this not the case with a newly established central bank such
as the ECB.
It thus appears that Swedish financial institutions have largely been happy with
the actual policies perused by the ECB, but would welcome a greater
transparency. That includes defining the bank’s policy goal explicitly in terms of
one variable only, i.e. inflation, and more clearly communicate its analysis and
the models.
1.4 Institutional Positions
Seven parties are represented in the Swedish parliament. The Social Democrats,
the largest party, currently governs with the support of the Left party and the
Greens. The opposition is composed of the Conservative, Christian-Democratic,
Liberal and Centre Parties.
In 1961 the then Prime Minister Erlander delivered a well-known speech at the
annual congress of metal industry workers’ union, which for a long time defined
Swedish and Social Democratic policy towards the European Community. The
speech maintained that membership in the Community was incompatible with
Sweden’s military non-alignment. The Social Democratic position was
overturned in 1990, and Sweden applied for community membership in 1991.
Since the conservative and liberal parties had advocated Swedish community
membership for some time, there was now a strong parliamentary majority in
favour of membership. Also the major trade unions and the employers’
federation were in favour of membership.  Among the political parties, the Left
party and the Greens were against membership while the centre party was
divided. The Social Democratic party and to a lesser extent the Christian
Democratic party had significant minorities against membership. Following an
advisory referendum in the late autumn of 1994, with a small but significant
majority in favour of membership, Sweden joined what had then become the
European Union (EU) in 1995.
The government appointed a commission 19 October 1995 to consider the
consequences of Swedish participation in the third stage of EMU. The
commission, lead by Professor Lars Calmfors, consisted of seven economists
and presented its conclusions in October 19962. The commission considered the
impact of the Euro on the overall economy, conditions for stabilisation policy
and political consequences. The conclusion reached was that EMU membership
would promote economic efficiency and Swedish political influence in Europe,
but would worsen the conditions for a successful stabilisation policy. Therefore
the Swedish economy should not join the third stage in 1999, but wait until its
economy had improved.
At that time Sweden was still recovering from a severe depression in the early
1990s, and it was considered too dangerous to commit to a fixed exchanged rate.
Also the labour market was singled out as an especially weak spot: Since the
beginning of the mid 70s Sweden had escaped several severe cost crises due to
rapidly rising wages, only by devaluating the currency. Before definitely fixing the
exchange rate, Sweden therefore needed a more flexible labour market to
compensate for the loss of monetary policy.
It should be noted that the major investigation into the single currency was lead by
an economist, and analysed primarily from the point of view that Sweden should
join if was economically beneficial, and otherwise stay out.
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In a bill3 accepted by parliament 4 December 1997, the government proposed
that Sweden should not join the third stage in 1999, but remain prepared to do so
at a later date. The main argument for this policy was the lack of public support
for the Euro, as documented by public polls and other indicators.
The “wait and see” approach has remained the official government policy to this
day. Overall, there has been a shift towards a more positive attitude towards an
EMU membership, and increasing number of political leaders have expressed a
favourable opinion towards EMU membership.
Several political parties have long since taken a stance on the EMU issue. The
two most market oriented parties, the Conservatives and the Liberals, are in
favour, while the Left Party and the Greens oppose membership. Christian
Democrats are tentatively in favour, while the Centre Party is sceptical. This
almost precisely reflects the position taken in the earlier question of EU
membership. When evaluating the positions taken be the different parties, it
should be remembered that the EU is traditionally thought of as a right-of-centre
friendly project. This is obviously different to the situation in the UK, another
non-continental European country. The UK has a lower tax rate and a smaller
welfare state than the European Union average. Conservatives in that country
therefore have come to fear that integration may lead to the adoption of more
interventionist policies.
The major question mark in regards of Swedish EMU policy was long the Social
Democratic party. As is not uncommon in Swedish politics, the party could find
a majority in parliament regardless of what position it takes. However, the party
has delayed taking a stance for some time. Partly this reflected the conclusions
reached in the Calmfors report mentioned earlier: there were considerable
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concerns that committing to a fixed exchange rate could be dangerous in view of
Sweden’s history of rapid wage and price increases. An improving economy
during the last few years has eased these concerns somewhat.
However, there is also a strong rift within the party, just as it was in the EU
question. Although a majority of the party’s leadership is in favour of joining the
currency union, a more mixed picture emerges at a grass root level. There is a
strong minority group within the Social Democratic Party that feels that the
EMU will have negative effects on Swedish society. Ms Margareta Winberg,
minister of agriculture and gender equality, has for instance publicised a debate
article in Sweden’s largest daily newspaper “Aftonbladet” (27 Dec 1999) with
the title “With EMU back to 1920”. The message is that adopting the Euro
would undermine the position of women in Swedish society to such an extent
that they would be worse off than in 1920, when women had not yet acquired
the right to vote. The reason is that integrating with Europe will undermine the
Swedish welfare state, which is thought to have benefited especially women, for
instance by providing public sector jobs. The Social Democratic Women’s
organisation also decided that it is against Swedish EMU membership during
January 2000.
According to Stefan Hejelid, an associate Professor of Political Science at Växjö
University who has studied the Social democratic handling of the EMU issue,
Prime Minister Göran Persson is not negative to a common currency as such. He
has on the other hand harboured certain fears that it may eventually come to
undermine Social Democratic redistributive policies. He has however, come to
realise that the political price in terms of reduced influence in Europe is too high
to pay. Especially during the upcoming Swedish 2001 EU presidency, the issue
cannot be left totally open. Mr Persson therefore began to stress during 1999 that
the choice is only membership now or membership later – Sweden has not
negotiated an exception to the Maastricht treaty as Denmark and the UK have.
However, there has been an unwillingness to create the impression that a pro-EMU
stance has been forced upon the party members. Also, committing to the single
currency may scare away voters to the anti-EU minded Left Party. The party
leadership has therefore mainly waited for a shift in public opinion and within the
party. Those in favour of the single currency – among them former Social
Democratic Minister of Finance, Erik Åsbrink – have criticised this inertia.
Finally, the party’s executive board unanimously declared its support for
Swedish EMU membership on 14 January 2000, saying that it would “counter
market forces”. The Party’s congress during 10-12 March 2000 proceeded to
accept by a two thirds majority a statement in favour of Swedish membership
and that the issue should be settled through a public referendum. Party
leadership would have preferred not being obliged to hold a referendum, but was
forced to accept this by grassroots opinion and EMU sceptics. A date for the
referendum, which under the constitution can only be advisory, has yet to be
settled. It is unlikely that it will be later than the autumn following the general
election in 2002.
2. Legal Framework: A Note
As a part of the second stage of EMU, the independence of the Swedish central
bank (Riksbanken) was strengthened. The central bank is regulated by Chapter 9
of the constitution and also by a special Riksbank law4. Changes in the
constitution are regulated in Chapter 8 of the Swedish constitution. The basic
requirement is that a bill proposing constitutional change must pass twice in
parliament by simple majority, with a general election in between (note that the
pending constitutional change is not an issue in the election). Since the present
constitution came into effect in 1974 it has been amended after every general
election.
The bill5 proposing change of the constitution was accepted by parliament the
first time 4 March 1998 and the second time 25 November 1998, the latter time
together with changes in the Riksbank law. The changes came into effect 1
January 1999. The opinion of the Swedish government is that it is necessary to
adjust Swedish legislation only when it directly contradicts EU legislation, as
the latter automatically takes precedent over national legislation. Nevertheless it
is considered appropriate that the constitution reflects how the country is in fact
governed. Two difficulties remain: Chapter 9 paragraph 12 which gives the
Swedish central bank authority over monetary policy and paragraph 13 which
gives the central bank the sole authority to issue notes and coins. The
government has said this must be changed before joining the third stage of
EMU, but that it is sufficient that the constitutional change is pending, i.e. not
been accepted by parliament a second time6.
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Among the four EU countries outside the Euro zone, Sweden is a unique case: It
lacks the formal opt-out enjoyed by the UK and Denmark, and unlike Greece
managed to fulfil the economic convergence criteria. Ulf Bernitz (Professor of
European Integration Law at Stockholm University) pointed out in 1995 that
Sweden was formally bound to join the EMU. This appears to be the generally
accepted view today in Sweden. Hence Sweden has granted itself an opt-out –
arguably a bad example for present applicant countries which have not been
given opt-outs. Nevertheless, in the government bill that laid out the policy
of not joining the third stage in 1999, an attempt to provide a legal basis for
Sweden’s decision is presented7. Sweden made a statement when EU
membership negotiations opened on February 1, 1993. That statement was: ”A
final Swedish position relating to the transition from the second stage to the
third stage will be taken in the light of further developments and in accordance
with the provisions in the Treaty”. The bill continues: “It was judged to be more
appropriate to make a unilateral declaration than to try to get the same formal
opt-out that Denmark and the United Kingdom have.”
The government’s position has also been that public opinion is more important
than legal formalities. During April 2000 both Romano Prodi and Anna
Diamantopoulou have made statements in Swedish media to the effect that
regardless of the legal situation, the opinion of the people must be the decisive
factor. It is also important that prior to the 1994 EU membership referendum the
Government repeatedly stated that EMU participation would be decided at a
later stage, after consulting the people. The legalistic argument, although
technically probably correct, is therefore politically dead.
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<http://finans.regeringen.se/euro/language/engelska/bills/bill.htm>.
The earlier commissioner for EMU and economic policy Yves-Thibault de
Silguy did criticise the Swedish failure to adopt the Euro. An indication by the
Swedish Prime Minister that EMU was a “shaky” project provoked some anger.
De Silguy’s successor, Pedro Solbes, has adopted a softer tone, and has been
content to express a wish that Sweden will join soon.
At present the trend appears to be towards accepting a greater degree of
divergence in the pace of EU integration among EU member states. This
increases the likelihood that continued Swedish unwillingness to commit EMU
membership will be tolerated at least for the time being.
Nevertheless, Sweden remaining outside the Euro area does pose certain
problems for the EU. In negotiations with prospective future member states in
Central and Eastern Europe, the EU standpoint is not to allow exceptions and
that agreements must be followed. The fact that Sweden has been able, so to
speak, to get away with not strictly following the Maastricht treaty could
potentially be viewed as establishing a precedent for other countries.
The EU presently stresses that all future members must strive to reach
convergence criteria and join the EMU. There has been an unwillingness to
extend the kind of formal exemptions given to UK and Denmark to other
countries. If some country were to refuse, once it had entered the union, and
refers to Sweden an interesting situation would clearly emerge. It is not
immediately obvious what would legitimise Sweden’s non-compliance and the
demand for compliance by other countries. Nevertheless this situation will not
emerge for some time yet, and it is quite likely that by the time the EU is
enlarged the next time, Sweden has already adopted the single currency. It is
therefore quite possible that the EU’s current pragmatic attitude towards Sweden
will prove the least problematic in the long run.
Finally, what might put Sweden’s situation in an entirely new light is if the UK
was to join. Whether the UK joins or not is obviously an issue of vastly greater
importance to the EU than Sweden’s status. With UK in the EMU, the spotlight
would be put on Sweden and Denmark, and it is highly likely that both those
countries would soon follow suit. However, as things are developing in Sweden
at present it is not unlikely that Sweden will join the EMU before the UK.
But before joining some legal alterations are necessary. Sweden at present does
not fulfil all its legal obligations regarding the achievement of economic and
monetary union, as specified in Article 109(j) of the Treaty and the Statute of
the ESCB. This is pointed out, for instance, in the March 1998 convergence
report of the Commission.
The most important aspect of this is that the present Swedish constitution
specifies that monetary policy and printing of money is the sole responsibility of
the national central bank. This must be altered if Sweden is to be eligible to
adopt the single currency. In practice, changing this will also imply alterations
of several basic laws, though this of secondary importance.
Technically altering the constitution is a minor issue. All it takes to change the
relevant paragraphs are two decisions with simple majority in parliament with a
general election in between. However, given Sweden’s wait and see approach to
the single currency, no action has been taken in this regard so far. The next
election is in 2002 and the following in 2006. That means that if the changes are
to formally come into effect before 2006, the first decision in parliament must be
made prior to next upcoming election.
2.1 Euro related legislation
2.1.1 Accounting in Euro
There is nothing that stops a Swedish firm from conducting its business in Euro.
However, regarding accounting there is legislation requiring use of Swedish
currency. For some time it was discussed whether limited liability companies
should be allowed to have its official accounting denominated in Euro. Many
major government agencies and business agencies approved this, and it was
expected that the government would present a bill to parliament during mid
1999. However, it was delayed, but finally presented in November 1999 and
accepted in March 2000. Accounting must in its entirety be in either Euro or
Swedish kronor. Taxes are always to be paid in kronor, and for this purpose
special conversion tables are to be used. This will mean that the government
takes on a currency risk (as long as there is no fixed exchange rate between
Swedish currency and the Euro). The government believes that it will not be
systematically disadvantaged by such an arrangement, but stands ready to
reform the system if that would turn out to be the case.
The decision to switch to accounting in Euro must be made by the shareholders’
meeting, and can be valid from 1 January 2001 at the earliest. Taxes will still be
paid in Swedish kronor, and be based on the annual average exchange rate
between the Swedish currency and the Euro. In the case that Sweden adopts the
single currencies this legislation will of course become redundant, and possibly
that is why the implementations is delayed.
2.2 Other legislative areas
During 1996 the government initiated the project “Practical Euro preparations”,
which was to make Sweden prepared to join the Euro zone. One part of this
work was a comprehensive listing of needs for legislative change as a result of
the introduction of the Euro. However, this work slowed down after the “wait
and see” strategy was formally adopted by parliament in December 1997.
Roughly, there is today a good overview of the needs for legislative when result
of Sweden adopting the Euro. The bulk of the change necessary will be routine
adjustments, such as re-specifying amounts presently expressed in terms of
kronor.
Regarding a possible future conversion of government debt into Euro, two
methods are allowed in the Maastricht treaty: on the basis of individual holdings
or for each outstanding debt instrument. The national debt office has argued that
the former alternative is more practical. However this alternative will require
special legislation. This is unlikely to cause any difficulties, as it is a standard
procedure carried out by all Euro countries.
In the case of delay of Swedish adoption of the single currency, it might be
necessary to deal with a situation of the Euro functioning almost as a parallel
currency. This could for instance become the case if the major multinationals
were to utilise the new legislation allowing them to have their accounting into
Euro. It is not impossible that major corporations would then also start billing
subcontractors in Euro.
The tax authority especially has expressed concern that it would be difficult to
deal with tax payments in two different currencies with a floating exchange rate.
There is also some debate about whether a situation with a parallel Euro
currency would create a need for additional legislation. So far, this debate has
not produced concrete demands for legislative action. It is likely that the use of
the Euro in Sweden will become a practical issue before 2002.
3. Some Trends towards Spill Over
Adopting a new common currency will have effects on numerous policy areas,
reaching far beyond monetary policy. One of the most obvious areas is the other
major instrument of stabilisation policy, i.e. fiscal policy. According to the well-
established Mundell-Fleming model, fiscal policy is ineffective under floating
exchange rates, but effective under fixed rates.
To the extent that ECB monetary policy is not well suited to Swedish conditions
in the future, for instance due to an asymmetric chock to the Swedish economy,
the main macroeconomic stabilisation tool available to policy makers is fiscal
policy. It should be noted though that the freedom to use fiscal policy might to
some extent be illusionary for a small country such as Sweden. Even in a time of
recession, it may be difficult to try to stimulate the economy by means of
expansionary fiscal policy if major member countries do not do the same. Fear
of a build-up of inflationary pressure could scare away investors. Also Sweden
has, as a part of a budget reform process, introduced legislated spending caps,
which in principle could create difficulties for a government wishing to pursue
discretionary fiscal policies.
As many other countries, Sweden has carried out a major program of fiscal
consolidation during the 1990s. In Europe this trend towards fiscal prudence has
to large extent been driven by the need to fulfil the Maastricht convergence
criteria. However, it would no doubt be incorrect to see the EMU as the only
driving force, as the pattern has been obvious also in North America. Indeed
growing government indebtedness became a pressing issue already after the first
oil crises in the early 1970s, and by the 1990s there was finally enough
momentum in the political system to tackle the issue even if it entailed painful
measures.
In the case of Sweden, it is clear that irrespective of the EMU project there was
an urgent need to reduce the massive deficits caused by the severe recession of
the early 1990s, which was undermining investor confidence. Nevertheless, the
government has frequently referred to the convergence criteria as a reason for
implementing the austerity program.
Today, when there may still be sound reasons to continue a policy of fiscal
prudence, but no immediate pressure to do so, the convergence criteria may have
some role in keeping the government to resist attempts to increase spending.
During 1999 and 2000 the Minister of Finance Mr Ringholm has expressed
concern over strengthening demands for new expenditure.
The continued integration of the European economies creates a need for
harmonisation in many different areas. The effect of adopting the Euro is likely
to heighten that need, but without being revolutionary in most cases.
An excellent case of this is tax reform. Sweden finances its extensive welfare
state by taxes that are reported to be the world’s highest. During the last few
years there has been an intensified discussion about whether this state of affairs
will prove unworkable in a globalised economy. There is further an ongoing
discussion on tax harmonisation within the EU, and for Sweden this is more
likely to entail downward rather than upward pressure on tax rates.
Nevertheless, adopting the single currency is unlikely to have a dramatic impact
on the situation. The Prime Minister as taken the position that the Euro will not
have a major impact on these issues.
BRITISH REPORT
Robert Kissack*
1. Introduction – The European Parliament Elections (June 1999)
The British electorate, like those of every other European Union (EU) member,
voted in June to elect members to the European Parliament in Strasbourg.
Britain is one of the four EU members outside the ECU - the euro-zone under
the direction of the newly formed European Central Bank (ECB), and
consequently the election campaign was principally fought upon the issue of
adopting the euro in the absence of an effective Labour (and Liberal Democrat)
campaign.  ‘Euro-sceptics’ argue against future use of the euro and belong to the
UK Independence Party and the Conservative (‘Tory’) Party.  Pro-Europeans
tend to belong to the Liberal Democrat or Labour Parties, although there is a
small but influential minority of Conservative MPs who favour converting to the
euro currency.  Despite the two distinct opinions within the political arena, little
genuine debate between the two sides has taken place.  Each side has identified
strengths and weaknesses in the arguments that substantiate their position, and
stick dogmatically to them.  Pro-Europeans say that the euro will improve the
efficiency of the single market, and Britain should be participating fully to
prevent it being economically disadvantaged by exchange rate fluctuations
between the euro and the pound.  They suggest that Britain should take the
initiative and join soon, rather than stubbornly wait until Britain is economically
damaged by non-membership before joining.  Their assertions for early entry
use the wisdom of hindsight gained from Britain’s relationship with the EU
predecessors, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the
European Economic Community (EEC) but in essence believe membership is an
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inevitability forced by economic necessity.  Alternatively, Euro-sceptics regard
the ‘surrendering’ of the pound and the handing over of control of monetary
policy from the Bank of England in London to the ECB in Frankfurt as a mortal
blow to British sovereignty.  The pound is taken as a symbol of British
autonomy against the prevailing political current that flows towards the
centralised nightmare of the right, the ‘United States of Europe’.  The pro-
Europeans have claimed economic reason to further their cause while the euro-
sceptics use nationalist rhetoric to stir up sentimental feelings.  Consequently, it
has become very hard to find a well reasoned and unbiased presentation of the
relevant economic and political factors.  The lack of clarity was apparent in the
election results.  The Conservative Party won the largest proportion of the vote,
(35.8%), campaigning under the slogan ‘In Europe, not run by Europe’.  The
sceptics would therefore appear to hold the advantage, until one considers the
turn out was less than 25%.  These two statistics succinctly demonstrate the
current climate in British politics.  The emotional, nationalist rhetoric used by
those who associate defending the pound with standing defiant on the White
Cliffs of Dover struck a cord with a small portion of the population, who
vigorously campaigned from that perspective.  The majority of the electorate
remained unconvinced by this argument, but were equally uninspired to vote for
the advocates of an unstoppable economic process.
This thumbnail sketch of the political situation highlights two points.  The first
is that British politicians have suddenly taken notice of the vocal segment of the
society who are hostile to Europe.  The June election results have signposted the
direction the parties shall take over the coming year, galvanised in the last
month during the political parties’ conference season.  The second point reflects
a theme which will be reiterated throughout this report.  The debate over the
euro and by default, about the EU, is the major fracture both between parties and
within parties.  The Liberal Democrats are the most harmonious, the
Conservatives are the most divided and Labour lie somewhere in between.  A
pro-European group has formed a cross party lines - Britain in Europe (BiE) -
that is arguing the case of general EU membership but focusing more heavily on
economic concerns.  BiE remains locked into the prevailing paradigm where
pro-Euro arguments centre upon economics, while critics focus on the political
issues of sovereignty and tradition. Both sides are preparing for the referendum
scheduled for 2002, and are sticking to their rehearsed arguments rather than
engaging in an open discussion.  Until an open debate takes place in which both
sides talk about politics and economics, the prevailing paradigm will not be
altered and vicious circle shall be perpetuated.  This point shall be returned to
later, but for the moment let us concentrate on the June election.
1.1 Direction in the Coming Year
As mentioned above, the results of the European Parliament election have
defined the political agenda in Britain over the last three months.  Early Autumn
is traditionally the time in which all the major political organisations (parties and
trade unions) hold conferences. The voice of scepticism has been heard and duly
recorded, (expressed most forcefully in the UK Independence Party and a little
more mildly with the Conservatives), as was evident in the manifestos unveiled
at the conferences.
figure 1: European Election Results June 1999 (UK excluding Northern Ireland)
PARTY PERCENTAGE OF
VOTES
SEATS
CONSERVATIVE 35.8 36
LABOUR 28.0 29
LIBERAL DEMOCRAT 12.7 10
UK INDEPENDENCE 7.0 3
GREEN 6.3 2
NATIONAL
(SCOT&WALES)
4.5 4
OTHERS 5.7 0
SOURCE: THE ECONOMIST JUNE 19 1999
The election result’s strongest influence was felt in Blackpool, where the
Conservative Party held its conference.  Two years of confusion have reigned
since their defeat in May 1997 by Tony Blair’s New Labour, and the European
elections showed the first signs of a revitalisation in the party’s fortunes.  It is
ironic that the most anti-European mainstream party performed well during the
European elections.  The leader of the party, William Hague, has progressively
strengthened his line against Europe, suggesting that he wanted to re-negotiate
the Treaty of Rome to allow all future EU legislation to be adopted by individual
member states as they choose rather than uniformly.  He sees this approach as
being the most suitable method for tackling the issue of enlargement, as ‘wider
rather than deeper’.  The former Prime Minister, Lady Thatcher, remarked that
‘In my lifetime all the problems have come from mainland Europe and all the
solutions have come from the English-speaking nations across the world.’8
However, in a reaction against the party’s hardening towards Europe several
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prominent senior Tories have stepped forward, including Chris Patten (EU
Commissioner for Foreign Affairs and former Party Chairman), John Major
(former Prime Minister), Michael Heseltine (former Deputy Prime Minister) and
Ken Clarke (former Chancellor [Finance Minister]).  Their common fear is that
the party is making itself un-electable and is driving itself further from its
traditional role as the internationalist party in British politics - one should not
forget that Winston Churchill was instrumental in founding the Council of
Europe and Edward Heath took Britain into the EEC.  It has been suggested that
one explanation for the Tory slide towards an anti-Europe nationalism is that a
party out of power has more freedom in writing a manifesto than a party in
power.  This is undoubtedly a relevant point, however the majority of observers
agree that the party leadership is desperate for unity and is willing to look for it
anywhere.  The gravity of the situation was highlighted shortly after the
conference when pro-Europe Conservative MPs hinted that they might defect en
masse to the Liberal Democrat Party if the present line on Europe is maintained.
The Europe-Question is cutting new divisions in British politics.
The Liberal Democrats lie on the opposite extreme.  They campaigned in the
June elections for a definite date for a referendum on joining the euro, and have
consistently advocated stronger ties with Europe.   They polled 12.7% of the
vote, much lower than in the last General Election, but celebrated the
introduction of Proportional-Representation by winning 10 seats, 8 more than in
the previous parliament.  The party has criticised the government for not being
active enough in promoting a pro-European agenda, allowing the Conservatives
to gain the upper hand in their campaign again Europe.  This criticism reflects
the difference between the Liberals who debate Europe as an economic, political
and social issue, and the current government that concentrates only upon the
economic aspects.  Britain will hold its referendum upon joining the euro when
the government decides that the five economic convergence criteria have been
met, a strategy referred to as ‘wait and see’ (See appendix 2 for the conditions).
The Liberal Democrats rightly criticise this approach as being too passive in
comparison with the assertive message sent out by the anti-Europe parties.
The Labour Party is regarded to have been the loser in the European election.
They received a smaller share of the votes than in the General election mostly
because they failed to motivate their supporters to vote.  Despite a poor
performance in the June elections, the popularity of the party remains high, at
around 50%.  This suggests that the popularity of the Tony Blair is based on his
party’s performance in many areas, such as the buoyant economy, the
programme of social reform and his leadership in the Kosovo War.  However,
Blair is a supporter of the euro and is determined to win the next General
election to enable him to hold a referendum on the euro soon afterwards.  The
Labour Party is trying to prevent the euro-question becoming the dominant issue
in British politics to do two things.  Firstly it must prevent itself becoming
unpopular by being ‘tarred’ with the pro-euro brush, and secondly it must work
towards reversing popular distrust of the euro and actively support it.  It is
therefore little wonder that Blair has chosen to use economic arguments to
support Britain in Europe.  It emphasises pragmatism over idealism and allows
him to distinguish between his political agenda which is clearly popular and an
autonomous economic agenda concerned with the euro.  Blair has two aids
which add to his credibility in taking this option.  The first is the macro-
economic policy of the Chancellor (Finance Minister) Gordon Brown, that has
lead to sustained growth and long-term confidence in British businesses.  The
second is the reputation of Brown himself, who was recently made chairman of
the IMF International Monetary and Finance Committe, a position of prestige in
the world of international finance.  Blair’s approach to the euro-question is to
separate it from his domestic political achievements by regarding it as an
economic issue alone.  It is a logical procedure to follow, but as the Liberal
Democrats have argued, it could eventually prove too rational against the roused
emotions of the anti-Europeans.
Finally, the representatives of business (the Confederation of British Industry
[CBI]) and labour, (Trade Union Congress [TUC]), have recently held
conferences.  The two have been traditionally antagonistic to one another but in
recent years have become more co-operative with each other and shall be
participating with the government in another conference dedicated to
‘Knowledge Industries’ in the near future.  The armistice has been brought about
by their shared acceptance of the inevitability of Britain joining the euro.  It is
natural that business, having to plan investment strategies many years in
advance have been considering the British position for some time; it is also
recognised by the TUC president John Monks that membership of the euro-zone
will propel Britain to adopt the industrial-relations practises found elsewhere in
Europe, implying a role of the TUC in public policy issues, such as macro-
economics and social affairs.9  The CBI and TUC represent a pragmatic view on
the euro which is shared by the financial sector based in the City of London.  All
assume that Britain will join the euro at some point in the next 2-3 years - and
are the least ruffled by the recent election results because they have made
investment plans contingent upon it.  In certain respects, one could say that it is
now ‘up to the politicians’ to convince Britain that joining the euro is the right
thing to do.  But leaving it ‘up to the politicians’ risks placing too much
emphasis on current whims instead of presenting considered opinions to the
public.  It also risks perpetuating the dominance anti-euro campaigners instead
of encouraging government, industry and trade unions to argue their case
together.
1.2 Summary of the Present Situation
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The results from the June European elections have galvanised the political
debate in Britain around the issue of Britain’s role in the EU and the single
currency.  This is the prism through which British politics must be viewed, both
between and within parties.  The traditional perspectives of left and right, a
socialist programme of nationalisation and the right’s nationalist/conservative
(i.e. Burkian scepticism towards change) have found a common adversary in the
European Union.  On the other hand, centre-politics have moved towards
embracing the European Union’s ideals of increased economic harmonisation
coupled with an explicit social programme to promote civil freedoms, liberty
and prosperity.  The Labour Party has more successfully rid itself of the ‘old’
left than the Conservatives have of their traditional perspective of economic but
not political union.10  The Conservatives have sought to establish a
distinguishable distance between themselves and Labour by moving further to
the right, leading them to the inevitable position of advocating an end to
European integration.  This has lead to more moderate Tories joining Labour
and Liberal Democrats in a cross-party pro-European campaign organisation
Britain in Europe.   The political debate over euro-zone membership has been
characterised by a series of dichotomies - assertive, patriotic, nationalistic and
political in nature from the sceptics, while being passive, complacent and
predominantly economic-markets determined by its supporters.  The risk of this
campaign strategy is that it makes the EU look like nothing more than a
economic opportunity Britain is obliged to take, rather than a political
community that strives for social goals that Britain should share.  By continuing
on this tack  the sceptics are justified in arguing that European integration
represents an infringement on British sovereignty because both sides
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consistently fail to attribute a social dimension to the EU.  It could be said that
the pro-European lobby are at present their own worst enemy by refusing to
explain that the EU is about contributing to a vibrant political community - their
narrow economic arguments feed the sceptics the diet they depend on.  Without
embracing a positive view of Europe, sceptics will remain convincing when they
claim facelessness characterises Europe to its core.
2. Political Aspects
2.1 Public Opinion
Public opinion in Britain is heavily swayed by the negative press which
surrounds the European Union.  This can be seen in the monthly opinion polls
listed in Appendix 1.  Prior to the June elections the euro was enjoying its
highest level of support in Britain, peaking at a 35% figure who said they would
vote ‘yes’ for membership in a referendum.  This figure declined during the
summer, and is only starting to increase again in the last two months.  The figure
of 28% in November is still less than in March.  Reasons for this slide and
decline could be the worsening press surrounding the depreciation of the euro
during the summer and its revival as BiE begins to campaign.  An interesting
point to note is that the number of undecided voters, (‘Don’t Know’) has
remained constant, which suggests that the decline in popularity of the euro is
due to supporters becoming critics, rather than a rise in the number of people
expressing an opinion.  The dissatisfaction with the euro betrays a more general
uneasiness about the EU.  Political commentaries are usually neutral or critical
and rarely positive towards the successes of the EU.  This bias in reporting is
reflected in opinion polls, where the majority remain unsure or relatively
indifferent to the EU, with minorities for and against on either side.  The
European election results demonstrate this trend in the high level of apathy
among voters.  What are the reasons for this low level of public concern over
Europe?
The main reason for the low level of public interest in the EU is that the public
judges it through its coverage in the media, which in turn focuses on a few
popular issues.  Instead of a detailed survey of the performance of the EU in
areas such as laws protecting worker’s rights (the Social Charter) or the
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), all attention is concentrated upon
the euro and corruption.  These two issues re-iterate the stereotype that the EU is
an inefficient bureaucracy filled with ‘grey suits’ that want to homogenise all
aspects of ordinary life.   The public’s opinion of the EU is determined by a few
high-profile stories.
The euro debate is being held on an uneven playing field.  The two sides
consistently fail to fully debate all the issues relevant to helping an educated
electorate decide for itself.  One side talks of losing sovereignty and autonomy
in the world, yet is unsure what troubles foreign currency speculation might
have for the pound, while the other pays lip-service to notion of ‘pooling
sovereignty’ while concentrating on the number of people employed in Britain
in companies that export to the EU.  The greatest danger with this approach on
the political level, (I shall discuss the economic issues in the following section),
is the implication that economic determinism is a stronger force in deciding our
future than political will.  The purpose of this approach is to neutralise the
passioned rhetoric of euro-sceptics with the cold reason of market determination
- but it risks performing the opposite - neutralising the politics of the pro-euro
camp by making them appear subordinated to economic forces.  Until now the
euro debate has been dominated by agitated euro-sceptics frantically defending
British sovereignty.  Until the pro-euro camp confront the claims of their
opponents head on, and re-politicise their campaign, they will remain in a
defensive position.  Their defensiveness has naturally made them weaker given
the highly emotional rhetoric plied by anti-Europeans.
A second issue frequently regarded by the public as a typical characteristic of
the EU is cited the level of cronyism in the bureaucracy. Britain (rightly or
wrongly) prides itself on a domestic civil service that epitomises honest public
service.  The resignation of the Santer Commission due to the exposure of
nepotism within the European Commission reinforced the public perception of
dishonesty in the machinery of the EU.  If Britain is to join the single currency,
the performance of the new commission under Romano Prodi must be seen by
the British public to represent an improvement over its previous ways.  The new
commission includes the former Labour Party leader Neil Kinnock as vice-
president and commissioner in charge of reform.  Kinnock’s reforms must
succeed in two ways.  He must bring about change in the commission, and he
must present the British public with the evidence for his success. Kinnock’s
presence in the collective memory of the British electorate remains strong and
this should count in his favour in trying to banish for good the impression that
‘Brussels’ is synonymous with ‘inefficient bureaucracy’.  At the time of the
referendum, the reforms to the EU may be as important as the performance of
the euro itself in convincing the electorate to agree to the single currency.
Serious political debate has taken place on the fringes.  One of the most
interesting contributions made in the last year has been Professor Willem H.
Buiter’s paper titled Alice in Euroland.11  Professor Buiter raises the issue of
transparency and democracy in the decision making apparatus of a central bank.
He compares the procedure of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of
England (of which he is a member) with the Bank of Japan, the U.S. Federal
Reserve Board and the ECB.    In all cases bar the latter, the minutes and voting
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records of all meetings are published between two and eight weeks later.
Professor Buiter argues that the transparency of this procedure is  necessary in
an open, democratic society and acts to reassure the citizens that important
decisions concerning monetary policy are made with the best intentions.  He
then goes on to argue that this system is better at coping with the consequences
of economic failure, since it leaves open to scrutiny the decisions which with
hindsight were proven wrong.  From a position reminiscent of Karl Popper’s
Open Society, Buiter argues that the legitimacy of institutions such as central
banks in a democracy can only come through transparency and the
acknowledgement that if mistakes occur, it is acceptable in a situation that
permits scrutiny of the errors made in order to prevent them reoccurring.
Professor Buiter asserts that political openness builds stronger political units
than secretive, paternalistic systems.
Professor Buiter contrasts this to the current situation at the ECB.  The minutes
of committee and council meetings are not published for fear that national bank
representatives would not be able to take decisions in the interest of the euro-
zone when it conflicted with national interests for fear of domestic retribution at
the published evidence of their ‘disloyalty’.  Professor Buiter considers the
likely scenario in which the euro-zone begins to perform asymmetrically, when
a single exchange rate cannot be simultaneously appropriate for all areas within
the zone.  During such a period, the political strains in the euro-zone would
drastically increase, possibly ending in a crisis of legitimacy.  Buiter argues that
openness - not secrecy - is the answer because it allows for an enlightened
discussion to assist the ECB during the crisis and it allows for the most rapid
explanation on why things went wrong so as to prevent them being repeated.
The ECB cannot be legitimate in the eyes of the citizens of Europe, accustomed
as they are to democratic values, until it follows the example of other central
banks.
This article exemplifies the balanced debate over the euro that is woefully absent
from British politics at the present time.  It is an insightful piece of work that
critiques the EMU project with the purpose of improving them.  It contributes to
our understanding of the ECB and demonstrates the link between democracy,
transparency and legitimacy while applying them to the euro-debate.  Professor
Buiter asks whether it is right to abandon a relatively transparent system in
favour of a secretive one and answers by saying it is, providing one attempts to
change it.
Public opinion is therefore muted in its indifference and vocal in its frustration
with the euro.  Around the fringes of public opinion, there is a lively and
informed debate taking place, but this does not seem to be transposed into the
wider social arena by the media.  However, I think it is apparent from the
general position made throughout this report that this situation must change if
the pro-Europeans in politics wish to convince the public of their beliefs.
2.2 Institutional Opinion
‘Institutional opinion’ shall be taken here to refer to leaders of business, the
financial community of the City of London, the civil service and  trade unions.
They share a tendency to take a pragmatic approach to euro-membership,
regarding it as an inevitability which they must prepare for.  The Confederation
of British Industry and The City of London realise that their long-term
competitiveness is dependent upon Britain joining the euro.  Many have made
contingency plans to make the period between a positive referendum result and
membership as short as possible through good preparation and a careful
monitoring of the other euro-zone countries.  The adoption of the euro would
effect all government departments.  The Treasury and the Department of Trade
and Industry (DTI) have the most complicated agendas, the former supervising
the transition from one currency to the other and the latter preparing all business
- from corner-shops to multinationals - for the change-over.  Other departments
will follow the rest of Britain in re-accounting in euros.  The Civil Service
therefore must be prepared in the eventuality that a referendum has a positive
vote and to facilitate as rapid a transition as possible.
The balanced nature of institutional pragmatism stands in contrast to the public’s
fanatical political lobbying on a single issue found increasingly within
developed states.  Britain suffers from the syndrome too, found in the aftermath
of a move towards centre politics and the abandonment of the dominant
traditional ideologies of left and right.  Single issue politics takes over as holistic
ideological projects become less popular.  Lobby groups thrive by focusing the
political energy previously expended over a wide range of issues into one, and
by projecting the energy into the political arena.  The euro is such an issue in
Britain.  A mobilised minority is vigorously campaigning for one issue which
typifies the disenchantment frequently found on the fringes of centre politics.
Political parties are mesmerised by the brightness of the anti-euro campaign in
the midst of a dull counter-position.  Institutions differ by being more pragmatic
and less prone than political parties to being dazzled in this manner.
2.3 Analysis
The public opinion of the euro cannot be separated from their general perception
of the EU, implying that public consent to joining the euro will be influenced by
the overall performance of the new commission.  The debate is being steered at
the present moment by the euro-sceptic minority through their single-issue
lobbying.  Meanwhile, many institutions are steadily preparing to join the euro
without entering into a discussion over it.  The discussion which is being held -
such as the essay by Professor Buiter - deserves to be heard more widely, across
Britain and across Europe.  As he says in his paper, the electorate are highly
capable of understanding debated issues, and a transparency to the pros and cons
of membership will provide more fruitful and inspire a much higher
participation than the soundbites that is currently engaged in.
3. Legal Aspects
3.1 Procedure for Britain’s entry into the euro
In October 1997 the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, presented
Parliament with his euro-membership criteria.  These five points were decided
by the Treasury to be the issues by which Britain’s case for membership should
be considered and are listed in Appendix 2.  The EU has a similar set of criteria,
numbering four, which it shall consult as Britain (or any other non- euro EU
member) presents itself as a candidate for membership.  Once Britain decided to
join the euro through holding a referedum, the Government would notify the
Council of Ministers of its intension. The European Commission and the ECB
would begin monitoring the convergence criteria (price stability, sustainable
public finances, converging long term interest rates and exchange rate stability).
ECOFIN would decide if the criteria had been met, and present a
recommendation to the Council of Ministers, who would take the final decision
through a qualified majority vote.  During the convergence period, the pound
would become the effective fiat denomination of the euro, (as the euro-zone is
presently doing) until substituting sterling tender for euro notes and coins.  The
Bank of England, the Treasury, other government departments and private
companies are already preparing for the change by drafting change-over plans
and carefully monitoring the process elsewhere in the EU.  There are two sets of
legal issues to consider, at the British level and the European level.  I shall
briefly describe the European legal processes to which Britain must adhere
before looking in detail at how Britain intends to proceed.
3.2. The EU’s entry process
If Britain is to adopt the euro it must accept the stated procedure of the 11-euro
states.  The procedure was laid out in the Maastricht Treaty and the European
Communities (Amendment) Act 1993 under Protocol 11, and is in four stages.
The first stage is Britain’s notification to the EU that it intends to join - the
method by which a decision is reached shall be described in section 4.3.  This
amounts to agreeing to move to stage three of economic and monetary union as
laid out in the Maastricht Treaty, which the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland is not obliged or commited to without a separate decision
to do so by its government and parliament.  The EU Commission and the ECB
would then begin an assessment process on whether Britain had converged
sufficiently with the euro-zone to facilitate entry.  Four criteria would be used;
price stability, sustainable public finances, convergence of long-term interest
rates and exchange-rate stability against the euro.12  Britain would also have to
pass legislation to change the statute of the Bank of England in compliance with
the Maastricht Treaty’s blueprint for National Central Banks.  The reports would
be considered by ECOFIN, the committee of European Finance Ministers, who
would make a recommendation to the European Council.
Stage three is the decision by the Council after consultation with the European
Parliament, and assuming that there was a qualified majority in the Council, the
proposal would be returned to ECOFIN who would set an entry rate for sterling.
This rate would become the rate that Britain adopts to convert its national
accounts into euros.  The figure would require a unanimous agreement by the
participating member states of the Council and the UK.  These are the legal
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requirements made of Britain by the EU - let us turn to Britain’s current legal
situation and what it must do.
3.3 Britain’s legislative obligations
The first stages along the road to euro-membership have already been taken.
The reforms to make the Bank of England independent described in section 2.2
are necessary to comply with the Maastricht Treaty.  Further revisions would
have to occur upon entry, such as the removal of the bank’s right to set interest
rates, (which it would cede to the ECB), while it would retain responsibility for
the national debt and monitoring national banks.  However, before this could
take place, the first stage would be for the government to pass a bill in
parliament to hold a referendum.  Once this had been passed, the campaigning
by both sides would begin.  Assuming that there was a positive answer, the
government would officially submit notification to the EU.  Since Britain must
demonstrate stability against the euro for a sustained period of time, it may be
advantageous for Britain to join the ERM2, the successor to the Exchange Rate
Mechanism, which currently only Denmark and Greece belong to.  The
government must then move to convert all of its finances, both the current
accounts and the bonds it issues, into the euro.  It must also change its
international treaty obligations and legislate for the use of the euro in the
territories and dependencies of Britain.
3.4. Analysis
The short length of this section reflects the fact that Britain has yet to implement
many of these acts and they remain dependent upon a positive response in a
referendum.  Britain is certainly preparing itself discreetly and looking to the
euro-11 to learn from their experiences.  The Treasury expects it to be possible
to reduce the 80 months scheduled between the 1995 Madrid Summit and the
2002 introduction of notes and coins for the original 11 members to 40 months,
from a decision to join to holding a referendum (4 months), to joining (24-30
months), to circulating the currency (6 months) to end.
4. Economic Aspects
4.1 Marking the ballot paper with the Invisible Hand?
The pro-euro campaigners, unified in the Britain in Europe campaign,  have
claimed the high-ground over economic issues.  While this undoubtedly counts
in their favour, it does not mean that their work is done.  They must strive to win
the political arguments too, for fear of placing too much emphasis on economic
reasoning and too little on emotional sentiments.  A brief glance at the Britain in
Europe press pack distributed during their launch on 14 October 1999 contained
the following information:
• More than half of Britain’s trade is with the rest of the EU
• 3,500,000 British jobs depend on trade with Europe
• With 370 million people, the EU is the largest consumer market in the world
• Thanks to the EU, British workers enjoy a maximum 48-hour week13
The focus is almost exclusively on economic issues and even the last point
which deals with EU social policy focuses on the work-place.  However,
concentrating on economic issues alone does not make the case for Britain’s
entry to the euro-zone unassailable.  The analysis has been broken down into
three sections, macro policy, external projection and social policy.  Common
taxation policies throughout Europe currently only directly effect Britain
through the EU Commission’s role as trade negotiator, which has been the case
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for many years.  Direct tax harmonisation policies may follow as and when
Britain joins the euro.
4.2 Macro-economic policy
The first criteria for Britain’s entry into the euro-zone is convergence between
the interest rates in Britain (currently at 5.5%) and the euro-zone, (currently at
3%).  The difference between the two rates is caused by Britain being out-of-
phase with the economic cycle of the euro-zone economies.  Britain went into
recession in 1990-1991, with the situation worsening with its ejection from the
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in 1992.  As interest rates fell, so to did the
value of the pound, falling roughly 30% against the Deutschmark.  Low interest
rates and a competitive pound resulted in an export-lead recovery which has
been sustained over the last 6-7 years through careful fiscal policies, and has
been helped further during the last two years by an operationally independent
Bank of England setting the interest rate (see section 2.1).  By contrast the euro-
zone maintained a steady course much longer than Britain, but ran into
difficulties during 1995-9614 as the costs of German reunification financed by
government borrowing finally caught up with Germany’s economy in the form
of high interest rates.  The inefficiency of the ex-GDR infrastructure also
damaged Germany’s economy and as it slowed down, its trading partners were
also hurt. Thus Britain and the euro-zone remain in different stages of the
economic cycle and until they realign, Britain cannot be incorporated.
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It is vitally important that the two rates are as close as possible when Britain
enters the euro-zone, so that investment schedules are not disturbed as the ECB
rate is adopted.  A heavy fall in interest rates at the time of entry would cause
the British economy to expand rapidly, as savings decreased and consumption
increased.  Supply would not increase quickly enough to accommodate the
increase  in demand for goods and services (given the delay in restructuring
production schedules and introducing new investment) thus leading to
inflationary pressures.  Reduced interest rates could also lead to a property boom
fuelled by the availability of low interest mortgages.  An increase in the average
price of property leads to an increase in the calculated level of equity and can
lead to increased investment in stock markets.  These examples are just some of
the ways inflationary pressures could be triggered, possibly driving up wage
demands and leaving British labour too expensive to compete with other euro-
zone economies.  Furthermore, the removal of the exchange rate as a mechanism
for returning the economy to competitiveness through a devaluation would be
gone, and possibly result in a long-term decline in employment in Britain.  The
other extreme - a rapid rise in interest rates at the time of membership - appears
a less likely scenario - but would result in a recession due to reduced consumer
spending and reduced investment.
A further aspect to consider in the euro debate is the role of the EU as the major
trading partner of Britain.  As the TUC pointed out in their Preparing for the
euro brochure, ‘in 1996 we (UK) exported more goods to the Netherlands than
China, South Korea, Hong Kong, Indonesia and the other ‘Asian tigers’ put
together - and that was before the economic crisis which affected trade with that
area’.15  This picture can be enlarged to account for the whole of the euro-zone,
where currently 50% of all UK exports go.  To the pro-euro supporters this
figure is used to argue the case for euro membership, for it would certainly make
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trade easier with the rest of Europe.  But for a balanced macro-economic
perspective one must consider the effect on the rest of the economy.  To do this,
one must establish how large this ‘other’ part is.  An informative article by
Anatole Kaletsky, an economics commentator in The Times (7.9.99/p.31),
sought to deconstruct the assumption that because 50% of exports go to the
euro-zone, it is logical to join.  He begins by quoting the Foreign Secretary,
Robin Cook, as stating “We send a great majority of our exports to other
members of the European Union”.  Britain exported 58% of its goods to the EU
in 1998.  Kaletsky rightly points out that a more important figure is the
percentage of goods and services exported to the EU - 43% in 1998.  He goes on
to look at the percentage of goods and services exported to Europe as percentage
of the total output of Britain, which was a much lower 19%.  This figure denotes
how much of the economic activity in Britain is directly influenced by the
exchange rate between the pound and euro - in his opinion not much.  Kaletsky
takes his argument one stage further by distinguishing between the total value of
goods and services exported to the euro-zone with the value added within
Britain.  The rationale behind this is that if one half of the components in a
production process are bought from European suppliers, a strong pound favours
their purchasing, while also hurting their eventual sales.  This figure Kaletsky
estimates to be about 10% - in his view a small percentage to use as the
justification for joining the euro.
This interesting numbers game is useful but ultimately flawed.  Just as Kaletsky
rightly challenges those who use percentages to advocate euro membership, his
numerical presentation must also be challenged and charged with not presenting
the full picture.  A strong pound that remained over-valued against the euro
would damage all sectors of the economy that rely upon exporting to the EU.
His assessment that damage to these sectors could be tolerated ignores the spill-
overs within an economy and imagines that euro-dependent parts can be
completely isolated from the rest of the economy.  If a large section of the
economy was to experience a drop in sales due to a long term decline in
efficiency - and even the 10% he has reduced the UK economy to is very large
indeed considering a recession is defined as two consecutive financial quarters
with negative growth (including -0.25%) - Britain would be severely damaged.
His stance is also brought into question by economic trade theorists, who since
Adam Smith have demonstrated that wealth is created through trade and
exploitation of comparative advantage and not measures aiming at autarky.
From a macro-economic perspective it remains in Britain’s interest to improve
as much as possible its chances of trading with other economies.
4.3 External Projection of the euro
Britain is faced with a problem common to all non-euro-zone economies:  at
what exchange-rate should the pound (or drachma or krona) enter the euro-
zone?  In this section the focus shall be on the economic external projection of
the euro measured by the most watchful observers in Britain, namely British
industry.  The most pressing issue at the present time is the high value of the
pound against the euro.  It is in the interests of Britain to set a low level, thus
establishing a comparative advantage over the labour costs of other EU
members.   The Economist published a survey by the CBI asking British
businesses to state their preferred exchange rate for the pound.16  The first
interesting statistic is that only 26% of the 5000 firms responded.  Of those, only
52% agree to British membership, and the agreed value for the pound was 2.60-
2.70 DM, or (1.33-1.38 euros).  The Economist summarised this as an
“unrealistic hope...[t]he pound has not traded anywhere close to this rate, since
the launch of the currency at the beginning of the year.”  The TUC went further
by stating in their Preparing for the euro brochure an exchange rate between
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1.25-1.30 euros.17  While currently unrealistic, it is perhaps not totally out of the
question.  A crucial factor in making convergence possible is the independence
of both central banks and their shared objective of maintaining low inflation,
promising an eventual harmonisation.  In simple numerical analysis, the euro-
zone will begin to grow stronger, and as this happens interest rates will rise to
prevent consumer spending increasing and causing inflationary pressure.
Meanwhile the British economy is slowing, and to maintain growth at even a
reduced rate interest rates will fall, encouraging long-term investment and some
consumer spending.  As the difference in interest rates decreases, the value of
the pound will drop and the euro strengthen as assets are transferred out of
pounds and into euros.  Therefore it is conceivable that the value of the pound
will drop to a more favourable exchange rate as the conditions for membership
improve.  It is also agreed that a clear political commitment to membership
would also steady markets and bring about convergence more rapidly.
Unfortunately this is not quite the rosy picture it appears.  It has told the story of
the two economies ‘passing like ships in the night’ - the British economy
weakening and the euro-zone strengthening.  Under these circumstances there
has been no conversion towards the same economic cycle, simply rotation
within two separate cycles that are momentarily in-phase.  If the momentary in-
phase period was mistaken for full convergence, then membership could be
awful; just as Britain would need lower interest rates to stimulate the economy,
the ECB would be pushing for higher rates to ‘cool down’ the euro-zone.  It
would demonstrate the frailty of a political union based on economic interests as
described by Professor Buiter.  Just as the Governor of the Bank of England,
Eddie George, commented that unemployment in the north of England was a
price to be paid for the stability of the south, economic deterioration in Britain
would be regarded as the legitimate price to pay for prosperity in other EU
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states.  With a centralised interest rate across Europe, political ties need to be
strong enough to withstand the occasional centrifugal forces which will be
excerpted on them.
A medium to long term period of economic stability - steady growth and low
unemployment throughout all euro-zone economies is necessary to build a
political union which will be strong enough to weather the potential difficulties
of the future.  Hence it is seen as important that Britain joins at a time when its
economy is in harmony with the cycles of the other euro economies.  The debate
over joining the euro does not contest the points raised here.  All sides
acknowledge that joining the euro-zone at the wrong time could be risky - the
contentious issues are how damaging the failure of Britain to join would be and
if, at the proposed moment of entry, real convergence  had taken place or a
mirage of that - the ‘ships in the night’ scenario.
4.4 Social Policy: labour markets and the promotion of investment through
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
Labour market regulation is the most important aspect of social policy in the
euro-zone.  The flow of goods and capital throughout Europe must be matched if
the euro is to succeed, since its purpose is to promote stability and growth.
These two objectives will be achieved through removing bottlenecks in the euro-
zone economy.  One model which has attracted much attention is the USA.  The
US Federal Reserve acts within the American economy as the ECB does in
Europe - a single interest rate is set across a diverse and un-uniform economy.
The US economy is comprised of states in various stages of growth and decline
simultaneously, meaning that the Reserve’s interest rate is not always the most
appropriate for each state.  Europe would probably face greater problems
between member states given the fact that the euro-zone comprised of national
economies until very recently.  However, the US is vastly better prepared than
the EU to deal with the inequalities between regions with two policy tools at its
disposal - one micro economic and the other macro economic.  Labour mobility
is four times higher in the US than in Europe, a reflection on more rigid labour
markets and cultural and linguistic barriers to movement.  On the macro-
economic side the US has an enormous federal budget that is used to re-
distribute resources to stabilise local economies under pressure from federal
policy.  If one accepts the similarities between America and the EU, the lower
labour mobility of the latter must be regarded as an issue of concern.
British critics of the euro argue the lack of labour market flexibility is a good
reason to stay out of the euro-zone.  The euro will make demands of the market
which the EU’s social regulations will prevent from being fulfilled.  Against this
attitude the TUC has published a document entitled Jobs in Europe - what the
eurosceptics don’t tell you in an attempt to demonstrate the critics wrong.18  The
report sets out independent finding which demonstrate that the ‘social
partnership economies’ of Europe, by which they mean economies that have
high union memberships and co-operative (as opposed to confrontational)
management - union relations - such as Netherlands, France and Germany - are
‘world productivity leaders’. (p.3)  The paper contrasts these economies to ‘hire
and fire’ labour markets such as the US and to the UK.  It consistently finds that
the critics’ perceptions of ‘social partnership’ economies as being inefficient are
wrong.  Nevertheless, these arguments are by no means conclusive.  The data is
based on the national economies of euro-zone states prior to the establishment of
the euro, and  therefore demonstrates that the ‘social partnership’ model can
work on a national level, but it does not address the concerns of those who say
that cross-border labour mobility will be the problem the euro-zone must tackle.
                                                          
18 Jobs in Europe - what the eurosceptics don’t tell you TUC, June 1999.  Taken from
a press briefing given on 2.6.99.
Britain stands between the two extremes of a ‘hire and fire’ and ‘social
partnership’ labour market.  Despite Margaret Thacher’s policies that reduced
the power of unions during the 1980’s, Britain still values its social security and
healthcare systems and is therefore much closer to the European social model
than is sometimes admitted.  The evolution of the European labour market will
be hugely influential on Britain’s economic performance as a member of the
single market, and even more so when (or if) it joins the euro.
A second aspect of social policy concerns job creation, and in particular
attracting foreign investment into Europe.  Britain currently receives 40% of all
Foreign Direct Investment in the EU, (when ‘foreign’ means non-EU).  Japan is
one of Britain’s biggest investors (half of all Japanese investment in the EU is in
Britain - Toyota, Nissan and Honda have car-plants along with numerous
electronics manufacturers) as well as South Korea and other South East Asian
countries.19  The United States also invests heavily in Britain, frequently
choosing it as the centre for their European operations given the convenience of
the English language.  Supporters of the euro claim that the future of this
investment would be threatened by Britain’s refusal to join the euro-zone.  The
Financial Times (4.10.99) carried the headline ‘Japanese urge euro decision’ and
stated on its front page that Japanese executives were concerned with the high
value of the pound against the euro, and by failing to join the euro soon, Britain
would jeopardise it chances of receiving further investment.  The case for
joining the euro is heavily influenced by such statements by multi-national
companies.
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Dissident voices have been raised against this case.20  It has been pointed out
that 60% of all investment in Britain today by Japanese manufacturers is re-
investment, replacing or enhancing production facilities currently in existence.
This argument aims to persuade sceptics that the threat of an outpouring of
investment should Britain stay out of the euro is an exaggeration, since existing
infrastructure cannot be abandoned overnight.  It has also been said that it is
more important to retain access to the single market than join the euro, and only
if Britain’s membership of the EU was terminated would the case for investing
in Britain be seriously damaged.  The fact that the Japanese executives in the
article cited above pre-supposed a highly valued pound should not be
overlooked, since in the event of a weaker pound/stronger euro, the
attractiveness of Britain would increase.
While the previous paragraphs have accurately portrayed one of the biggest
debates concerning the economics of the euro, they have failed to take into
account the real factors determining FDI.  The decision to invest abroad depends
on much more than exchange rates alone, which by nature are the most
unpredictable variable in any equation concerning the long-term viability of
FDI.  Access to markets, macro-economic stability and local labour market
dynamics are equally - if not more important - influencing such decisions.
Britain stands half way between the American and euro-zone-norm for labour
market regulation and the less strictly regulated labour market in Britain has
undoubtedly tempted much of the recent FDI into Britain, and could continue to
do so.21  The macro-economic stability of the last few years should now become
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stable macroeconomics policies to have been influential in motor-industry investment in
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left the European Union.  The Economist (9.1.99) p.26.
a long-term reality given the recent independence of the Bank of England and
their objective of maintaining low-inflation and steady growth in the economy.
A strong currency encourages increased productivity within high-cost factories
and places them in a better overall position during periods when the currency is
weaker.  Taken together, these points are not aimed at refuting the views of
those who believe that Britain would be better within the euro-zone, but they do
demonstrate that exchange rates are not the sole determinate of FDI, and
guaranteeing a flexible labour market may prove equally important in
guaranteeing FDI in the future.
4.5 Analysis
Economic arguments have been appropriated by the pro-euro supporters in an
attempt to gain legitimacy for their case by appealing to economic logic and the
use of reason.  Their arguments are not so clean cut as is supposed and obscure a
more complex reality where simplistic arguments are found wanting.  The
economic case for membership remains strong, but the Britain in Europe
campaign should also work on political and social questions too since it is
ultimately a political decision.
Conclusion
An Anglo-Saxon Debate
The recurrent theme throughout this report has been the tendency of the two
sides to carve the social world into separate pieces which they can claim for
themselves.  The pro-Europeans of all political colours have agreed upon an
economic agenda, while euro-sceptics retort with a patriotic manifesto for
defending British sovereignty.  It has been the nature of the British philosophic
tradition to divide society into economic and political spheres - the private and
the public - since the Scottish Enlightenment figures of Smith and Hume.  This
continued through Bentham, Ricardo and Mill, and been seen in recent
incarnations in the ‘Chicago School’ of economics under Friedman and Becker.
The euro-debate has seen this happen once more, in Britain in Europe’s
campaign to publicly contest the issue on economic grounds.  This has a number
of flaws.  It ignores the real aim of European integration, which is the creation
of a peaceful and prosperous region that channels the fruits of its industry back
into social improvements.  The single market and the euro are means to a higher
social end which is being wrongly interpreted as an end in itself in Britain.
Domestically, describing the EU as nothing more than a market opportunity
risks portraying politics as an impotent social activity, chastised by the ruthless
efficiency of the market.  Pro-euro supporters are waiting for Adam Smith’s
invisible hand to come down and mark the ballot paper in the euro referendum.
A question of identity
The debate in Britain about the euro ignores old ideological lines by defining
new boundaries.  Pro-Europeans are seen as progressive, while sceptics are
conservative traditionalists.  But this dichotomy is a mirror that reflects Britain
as a whole.  Britain is struggling to understand its role in the world at the
beginning of the 21st century.  The traditionalists mourn the end of British
global domination but look to America as its legitimate heir, sharing culture and
language.   To these people the EU represents the final nail in the coffin of
Britain’s illustrious history, as the country slowly loses its sovereignty amidst
the gradual process of political and economic centralisation in Brussels.  To the
progressive, Britain, America and the EU have a completely different
relationship. The EU represents a new vision of political union that will
eventually grow to match the US in influence in the world.  Just as America’s
founding fathers pioneered a new form of political association, the EU has the
potential to repeat this visionary exercise in the coming decades.   Europe is
where Britain belongs, because its culture and history have been shaped over the
last 2000 years by it.  The list of similarities between Britain and other European
states is long: the philosophic heritage from Ancient Greece, the Roman Empire,
the Church, monarchies, the industrial revolution, nationalism and global
empires.  Britain’s reluctance to join the euro is partly due to an identity crisis.
Until the British realise that their history is as unique as every other European
state’s, and yet rooted in the same heritage, Britain will only reluctantly
participate in the EU.  In deciding whether we want to join the euro, we, the
British must decide who we are - whether we shall persist in looking to the past
or transform ourselves in the future.
Appendix 1: Opinion Polls
The following opinion poll results are taken from monthly surveys carried out
by the ICM Research on behalf of the Guardian Newspaper.  The questions
asked cover a range of current affairs and have therefore been edited to include
only questions directly relating to the euro.  The polls can be obtained from the
ICM website at http://www.icmresearch.co.uk/reviews/
ICM Guardian Poll - November 1999
Q3. If there were to be a referendum, would you vote to join the European
Single Currency, or would you vote not to join?
Vote to join 28%
Vote not to join 59%
Don't Know 13%
Q4. Leaving aside how you would vote, in 10 years time, which of the following
do you think is most likely?
The Euro will be the currency of most of Europe, Britain included 42%
The Euro will be the currency of most of Europe, but Britain will have
retained the pound 23%
The Euro will have failed and each European country will have their own
currency 27%
Don't know 8%
ICM Guardian Poll - October 1999
Q1. If there were to be a referendum, would you vote to join the Single
European Currency, or would you vote not to join?
Vote to join 27%
Vote not to join 58%
Don't know 14%
ICM Guardian Poll - September 1999
Q4. They [the Liberal Democrats] are also campaigning for Britain to join the
Euro and integrate faster into Europe. Does this make you more or less likely to
support them, or make no real difference one way or the other?
More likely to support them 16%
Less likely to support them 36%
Makes no real difference 41%
Don't know 6%
Q10. Do you think the party's policies on the new Euro currency is improving,
or damaging Labour's chances of winning the next election?
Improving 25%
Damaging 49%
Don't know 26%
Q17. The Conservatives have said that they will rule out membership of the
Euro currency likely to vote Conservative at the next election, or make no
difference one way or the other?
More likely 23%
Less likely 25%
Make no difference 47%
Don't know 5%
ICM Regular Poll August 1999
Q5. If there were to be a referendum, would you vote to join the Single
European Currency or vote not to join?
Vote to join 24%
Vote not to join 60%
Don't know 16%
ICM Guardian Poll July 1999
Q2. Overall would you say the government has done a good job or a bad job
on...Relations with the European Union?
Very good job 11%
Fairly good job 46%
Fairly bad job 14%
Very bad job 9%
Q3. If there were to be a referendum, would you vote to join the Single
European Currency or would you vote not to join?
Vote to join 25%
Vote not to join 62%
 Don't know 13%
Q4. Leaving aside how you would vote, in ten years time which of the following
do you think is most likely?
The Euro will be the currency of most of Europe, Britain included 36%
The Euro will be the currency of most of Europe , excluding Britain 26%
The Euro will have failed, all countries have their own currency 28%
Don't know 10%
ICM Guardian Poll - June 1999
If there were to be a referendum would you vote to join the Single European
Currency or vote not to join?
Vote to join 27%
Vote not to join 61%
  Don’t Know 13%
ICM Guardian Poll - May 1999
Q6.  If there to be a referendum would you vote to join the Single European
Currency or vote not to join?
Vote to join 35%
Vote not to join 52%
Don’t Know 13%
ICM Guardian Poll - April 1999
Q5. If Britain were to join the European Single currency, do you think Britain
will loose ability to decide the level of it's own income taxes?
Yes 63%
No 22%
Don’t Know 15%
Q6. If there to be a referendum would you vote to join the Single European
Currency or vote not to join?
Vote to join 34%
Vote not to join 53%
Don’t Know 13%
ICM Guardian Poll - March 1999
Q5 If Britain were to join the European Single currency, do you think Britain
will loose ability to decide the level of it's own income taxes?
Yes 63%
No 22%
Don’t Know 15%
Q8 If there were to be a referendum, would you vote to join the Single European
Currency, or vote not to join?
Vote to join 31%
Vote not to join 53%
Don’t Know 16%
Appendix 2: UK Entrance criteria
The five economic criteria set out by the Treasury that determine whether a
referendum should be held to decide whether Britain joins the euro are:
i) Whether the UK economy has achieved sustainable convergence with the
economies of the single currency.
ii) Whether there is sufficient flexibility in the UK economy to adapt to change
and other unexpected economic events.
iii) Whether joining the single currency would create better conditions for
businesses to make long-term decisions to invest in the UK.
iv) The impact membership would have on the UK financial services industry.
v) Ultimately whether joining the single currency would be good for
employment.
Source: HM Treasury: Outline national changeover plan  (1999) HMSO
London. page 3.
SYNTHESIS REPORT
Stefania Baroncelli*
The Third Stage of the European Monetary Union
and the Introduction of the Euro
Introduction: the Changeover to the Single Currency
The third stage of the European Monetary Union (EMU) started on the 1st of
January 1999 and will be completed on the 31st of December 2001. On the first
day of this period a number of occurrences have taken place. The euro was
introduced and recognised as the currency of the eleven States belonging to
EMU while the conversion rates linking the national currencies of the
participant States and the euro to these currencies were irrevocably fixed. Also,
the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and the European Central Bank
(ECB), which have been set up immediately after the decision has been taken on
which member States adopt the euro, became fully operational with the task of
deciding and implementing the monetary and exchange rate policies of the
Eurosystem ("Eurosystem" is the term formulated by the ECB to refer to itself
and the 11 central banks of the member States which have adopted the euro).22
The third stage is to be considered as both a transitional and a final phase,
designed for the smooth introduction of the euro in cash form. This requires a
mechanism of co-ordination for economic policies among the States
participating to EMU, whose effects in most cases are not limited to but extend
well beyond the third phase. It includes the enforcement of the Stability and
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Growth Pact, a progressive fiscal harmonisation, and the co-ordination of
macroeconomic and monetary policy (policy mix).
During this period, the States are also called to introduce modifications in their
legal order, even though the reform of the national central banks entered into
force well before the 1st of January 1999, as they were considered the
prerequisites for the States to accede to EMU. The new currency, which from
January 1, 1999 has been existing only as scriptural money, will start to circulate
as a single unit of account and medium of exchange with its own banknotes and
coins from January 1, 2002.23
The EC Treaty and the attached Statute of the European System of Central
Banks enshrine very detailed provisions regarding the powers and the
organisation of the ESCB and EMU. On the contrary, these two primary acts
contain only few principles on the euro. This latter is the object of secondary
legislation, consisting essentially of two Community regulations adopted
following the impetus of the various European Councils occurred in the second
half of the '90s that have designed the overall changeover scenario for the
transition to the third stage. The two regulations have been enacted to give a
legal basis to the Presidency Conclusions of the Madrid European Council, of
December 1995, on the scenario for the transition to the third stage,  which have
a mere political value. In fact, the European Council, without being part of the
Community institutions listed in Art. 7 (ex Art. 4) of the EC Treaty, has
acquired a crucial political power of direction and stimulus within the
Community that has been sometimes subject to criticism when this body has
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No. 17, February 1998, p. 11.
23 To have an idea of the quantity of euro banknotes to be printed for the launch of the
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intended to invade the responsibilities of the institutions.24 The EU Council (the
Ecofin Council)  has an important legal role  for the making of EMU and, more
particularly, for the introduction of the euro on the basis of Art. 123, par. 4 (ex
Art. 109L) of the Treaty, which also attributes to this institution the power to
take the other measures necessary for the rapid introduction of the euro as the
single currency.
Thus it was in Dublin, on 13 and 14 December 1996, that the Council decided
that the legal framework for the use of the euro would have been provided by
two Council regulations25 and not one as provided in Madrid. For the rest, the
Conclusions drawn at the Dublin Summit endorsed those adopted by the
European Council of Madrid, which was held one year before, in December
1995. In Dublin, the Council decided unanimously, amongst other things, that
the third stage of EMU would have only begun on January 1, 1999 due to the
lack of a majority of States fulfilling the convergence criteria necessary in order
to adopt the common currency before that date.26 The political decision to start
with the third stage on January 1999 had already been taken at the European
Council in Cannes, in June 1995 and confirmed in Madrid.
The Conclusions of the Madrid Presidency are relevant for the transition to the
third stage, because they introduce some legal principles underlying the
changeover to the single currency, which have been later on specified in the two
Council regulations on the introduction of the euro. Firstly, they make reference
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26 EUROPEAN COUNCIL OF MADRID, PRESIDENCY CONCLUSIONS, The Scenario for the
Changeover to the Single Currency, annex 1, December 1995.
to the concept of legal tender when they mention that the transitional period is
marked by the coexistence of the euro and the national currencies. These two
currencies are linked by a legally enforceable fixed equivalence.27 On the one
side, the national banknotes are mere sub-divisions of the euro and “continue to
remain legal tender within the boundaries of the respective national territories
until the completion of the changeover to the single currency [...] (and) cease to
be legal tender at the latest 6 months after the introduction of euro notes and
coins”. On the other side, circulating euro banknotes and coins “will have legal
status [...] by January 1, 2002”.28 Unfortunately, this text does not explain the
meaning of “legal tender”, and a further inquiry into the two regulations or the
EC Treaty (especially Art. 106 (ex Art. 105A)) is fruitless. From a legal point of
view, the quality of “legal tender” is recognised by the State to “coin, money, or
circulating medium which the law compels a creditor to accept in payment of his
debt, when tendered by the debtor in the right amount”.29 Clearly, the euro is not
legal tender in that sense during the transition period.
Secondly, the Madrid  conclusions announce the rule of no compulsion,
according to which private economic agents are “free to use the euro; at the
same time they should not be obliged to do so. As far as possible, they should be
allowed to develop their own mechanisms of adjustment to the changeover".30
This perspective concerns private persons, although States have to grant
freedom of choice to individuals, subject (as we will see) to certain limitations.
The concept of “no compulsion” is not new for the authors of the Maastricht
Treaty. But, it had another meaning in the preparatory works of the Treaty. In
fact, during the process leading to its adoption some States - namely Great
                                                          
27 Id. See N. LENIHAN, The Legal Implications of the European Monetary Union under
U.S. and New York Law, in EUROPEAN COMMISSION, DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR ECONOMIC
AND FINANCIAL AFFAIRS, Economic Papers, No. 126, January 1998, p. 13.
28 EUROPEAN COUNCIL OF MADRID, supra  note 26, point 14.
29 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, West Publishing, 1990, term "Tender", p. 1467.
30 EUROPEAN COUNCIL OF MADRID, supra note 26, point 9.
Britain and Denmark - upheld a “non-coercive” approach, refusing to enter
EMU by way of provisions enshrined in an international treaty.31 This position
has led these States to sanction their peculiar situation of “States with a special
status” into Protocols 11 and 12 of the Maastricht Treaty and is in contrast with
that of the other member States, more willing to sanction their obligations in an
international treaty.
The no compulsion rule in the use of the euro is usually linked to that of no
prohibition, meaning that people cannot be forbidden to use the euro, if they
want to. This parameter is less apparent than that of no compulsion. While the
latter is directly explicated in the Conclusions of the Madrid Summit and the
euro Council regulations (as we have just seen), the former is implicit in the
euro being defined as the currency of the participating member States, with the
effect of substituting the national currencies (principle affirmed in the Madrid
Presidency Conclusions as well as in Regulation 974/1998, Art. 2 and Art. 3).
The present text aims at offering a final assessment of the results highlighted in
the National Reports using mainly a legal-political approach. For this purpose, it
will analyse, in the first part (par. 1) the questions arisen in connection with the
adoption of the euro in the member States of EMU, including: a brief description
of the Community legal sources and their scope of application, an examination
on the ambit of discretion and freedom left to the States with a focus on the most
controversial legal issues raised by the EC regulations, and, finally, an inquiry
on the legal techniques used at national level and the connected problem of
redundancy. The second part (par. 2) will be dedicated to the reforms brought
about on the national central banks statutes. The analysis will concentrate on the
results of the polls presented in the National Reports, which will be confronted
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communautaire Dalloz”, février 2000, p. 15.
with the legal traditions and concepts (such as openness, accountability and
transparency) of the countries concerned.
1.  The Introduction of the Euro
1.1 EC Council Regulations
As already said, the secondary legislation mentioned by the EC Treaty and the
Madrid Presidency Conclusions resulted in the enactment of two EU Council
Regulations, which enshrine the core principles governing the changeover to the
single currency and establish the essential principles of the transition. Although
they are legal instruments that per se leave a little space to Member States for
manoeuvring, there are some spaces left to national intervention.
The first piece of legislation is Regulation No. 1103 of 1997, "on certain
provisions relating to the introduction of the euro" which entered into force well
before the introduction of the euro, on June 20, 1997. This early approval was
deemed necessary for reasons of legal certainty and clarity, in order to avoid
misunderstandings or bad expectations and to prepare individuals and economic
agents for a smooth transition to the European Monetary Union.32 Given the fact
that the Regulation entered into force before taking the decision on which States
would have participated to the Union, it contains mainly some specific
principles applicable to all the States of the Union. It also had the effect of
anticipating some legal principles, that entered into force only later on, and of
giving a legal form to the general maxims expressed during the summit of
Madrid. This is all the more clear if we consider that the recitals in the preamble
of the act outnumber the articles, which are only 6 in number.
                                                          
32 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1103/97 of 17 June 1997, "on certain provisions
relating to the introduction of the euro", 1997 O.J. L 162/1. The reasons at the basis of the
early approval of the Regulation are made clear in recitals (4) and (7).  See J.-V. LOUIS, Euro,
in “Répertoire communautaire Dalloz”, octobre 1997, p. 2.
The main principles laid down in this regulation are the correspondence between
the euro and the ECU, on the basis of the equivalence 1euro/1 ECU (Art. 2); the
important principle of "continuity of contracts (legal instruments)" (Art. 3); and
the technical provisions relating to rules of conversion and rounding (Art. 4 and
Art. 5).
This act gives important directions in the resolution of some controversial
aspects relating to the introduction of the new currency at national level, with
reference to the legal relationships linking mostly private economic operators
and financial agents. This is all the more so, if we consider that these rules were
followed by other non-binding acts of the Community, mostly
recommendations, which have as addressees not only the member States but also
all the economic agents of the Community. For example, this is the case of the
Commission Recommendation on the double pricing and other amounts, which
clarifies one of the problematic aspects of the changeover with a view to
consumer protection.33 In particular, this act does not recommend directly
double pricing of goods and services, although in the fourth recital double
pricing is defined by the Commission as a good way to ensure certainty and
clarity for all the interested people. Even if the double indication of price is
considered as non-compulsory, however it is recommended that once adopted it
has to be used in an unambiguous way, using the conversion and rounding
criteria outlined in the Regulation No. 1103.
                                                          
33 Commission Recommendation (EC) No. 98/287 of 23 April 1998, "on double
pricing and other amounts". See especially Art. 5 of the recommendation. Other non-binding
pieces of legislation include the Commission Recommendation No. 98/286 concerning "Bank
costs for the conversion into euro" and the Commission Recommendation No. 98/288 on "the
dialogue, the monitoring and the information to facilitate the transition into the euro". All
these recommendations have been adopted by the Commission on April 23, 1998 and are
published in 1998 O.J. L 130/22.
Regulation No. 1103/1997 is complemented by Regulation No. 974 of 3 May
1998, "on the introduction of the euro".34 This piece of legislation, with its
schematic and brief style, confirms and specifies the fundamental principles on
the introduction of the euro already declared during the Madrid Summit. It
establishes, in the first place, the fundamental principle that the euro is the
currency of the participating Member States (Part II of the regulation) and refers
to the concept of legal tender for the period after 1 January 2002, when both
banknotes denominated in euro and in a national currency unit will have such
status for a maximum period of six months (Arts. 10, 11 and 15). The difference
during this period (which can be shortened by each participant State via national
law) resides in the national currency units keeping their legal tender status
within their territorial boundaries only, and euro banknotes acquiring it in the
whole euro-area territory.
1.2 Scope of application of Council Regulations
Regulation No. 1103 of 1997 was enacted on the basis of art. 308 (ex 235) of the
EC Treaty, i.e. the ultima ratio provision entrusting the EU institutions with
powers to intervene on certain sectors lacking a more precise legal foundation.
The choice of Art. 308 as a legal basis means that all the States of the European
Union - their status within EMU being irrelevant - are bound to its provisions.
Why has Art. 308 been chosen instead of Art. 123, par. 4? As we have already
noted, this latter is the main provision on the matter and provides that it is up to
the Council, acting with the unanimity of the Member States without a
derogation, to take the other measures necessary for the rapid introduction of the
euro as the single currency of those member States. The reason derives from the
limited scope of application of Art. 123. As it refers only to the States without a
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euro", 1998 O.J. L 139/1.
derogation, the enactment of a regulation on its basis would have meant
postponing its entry into force until the decision would have been taken on
which States participate to EMU. Instead, reasons of legal certainty for citizens
and firms in all the member States were deemed preponderant so that it was
thought necessary to introduce the main principles of the reform well before the
entry into the third stage.35 In particular, these provisions were considered as
indispensable for dissipating doubts regarding the value of contracts
denominated in ecu and national currencies and the way of calculating the
conversion rate between the euro and the national currencies.36 The value of
"message" purported by the regulation, that we have already emphasised in the
previous paragraph, is clearly shown by the existence of some provisions which
entered into force only on January 1, 1999, in conjunction with the beginning of
the third phase of EMU. This is the case of Art. 2 on the equivalence between
ecu and euro.
Regulation No. 974/1998 entered into force on January 1, 1999, and it has
instead been adopted on the basis of Art. 123, par. 4. This choice is perfectly in
line with the requirements of the EC treaty; however it does not explain if the
States non participating to EMU - Denmark, UK, Greece and Sweden - are
included in its scope of application. On the one side, it can be argued that the
simple reference to the States without derogation made by Art. 123, par. 4, of
the EC Treaty justifies a limited scope of application of Regulation 974/1998.
This is the thesis upheld mostly by the States with a special status,37 that have
                                                          
35 Recital 4 of Regulation 1103/1997.
36 These being the main reasons, there were some others favouring this approach, such
as the importance for London to have immediate clear provisions on continuity of contracts;
the necessity of putting up information programs for conversion; and some doubts as to the
possibility for a regulation based on Art. 123 (providing for the adoption of strictly monetary
rules) to enshrine more specific legal provisions on continuity of contracts.
37 UK and Denmark are the main promoters of this interpretation. On this point, see
especially the Greek Report par. 2.1.1 .
also tried to influence the content of the regulation by adding an ambiguous
closing formula to Art. 17 of the regulation.38 On the other side, it can be
maintained that such regulation, being part of the Community legal order, is
applicable to all the States of the Union, notwithstanding their having a special
status or a derogation. This interpretation is preferable because it is more
consonant to the legal Community principles, as it is standard of primary law
that a regulation is entirely applicable in all Member States and binding in its
entirety, no matter the content of a contrary clause included in a simple
secondary act.
1.3 Scope of discretion left to the States
1.3.1 Internal Legislation Encouraging the Use of the Euro
After distinguishing between the scope of application of the two regulations, it is
interesting to examine the scope of discretion accorded to the States by these
two pieces of legislation. This is essential in order to acquire a uniform legal
framework for the different National Reports.
According to the case-law of the European Court of Justice, regulations are acts
incorporated into the legal framework of the member States without the need of
internal legislation aimed at implementing or elaborating them. However, as
pointed out by the Spanish Report, there are cases when some scope of
discretion is recognised to the States (Spanish Report par. 1.3). This is the case,
for example, when the regulation itself explicitly enables the member States to
explicate its content via an internal act.
Regulation No. 1153/1997 does not provide the States with a power of
implementation, as its provisions have not only a direct effect but also impose
                                                          
38 According to Art. 17 of Regulation 974/1998: "This Regulation shall be binding in
its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States, in accordance with the Treaty,
subject to Protocols No. 11 and No. 12 [on UK and Denmark] and Article 109K (1) [on
States non participating to EMU]".
on the States clear and complete obligations. These rules, mostly that of
continuity of contracts, can be in contrast with recognised principles of civil or
commercial law of a member State. However, this clearly implies an obligation
of the State (either through legislation or case-law) to apply the provision of the
EC regulation which provides for the continuity of contracts, such provision
taking precedence over any contrary rule of internal law.
The case of Regulation No. 974/98 is more complex. This act is composed of
some articles that do not confer any discretionary power on the States. This is
the case of the peculiar Art. 8, par. 3, allowing individuals (with some
limitations) to pay debts in euro or in other currencies notwithstanding the will
of the creditor.39 The wording of this provision has given rise to various
problems of interpretation relating to its extension; such question, however, is
                                                          
39 Art. 8, par. 3, recognises to individual debtors the power to pay either in euro or in a
national currency unit if some conditions are present. First, the debt should consist in an
amount denominated either in euro or in a national currency unit of a participating State.
Second, the debt should be payable within that member State (thus the currency of this State
should correspond to the currency of the denomination of the debit: i.e. a debt denominated in
French francs payable in France). Third, the debt should be payable by crediting the account
of the creditor (i.e. no cash payments). If all these conditions are met, then the debtor can
discharge himself by paying in the currency of his choice, while the amount paid shall be
credited to the creditor in the denomination of his account. This provision implies an
obligation of credit institutions to convert the amount paid by the debtor into the currency of
the creditor's account at the irrevocably fixed conversion rates.
Academic literature on the subject is extensive. See, for example, N. LENIHAN, supra
note 27,  p. 18; J.-V. LOUIS, El nuevo Derecho monetario de la Unión Europea, in “Noticias
de la Unión Europea”, Agosto/Septiembre 1999, 175/176, p. 10; H. BRONKHORST, General
Introduction to the Provisions of the EC-Treaty and of Secondary Legislation Concerning the
EMU and the Euro, in J.-V. LOUIS - H. BRONKHORST, The euro and european integration,
P.I.E., Peter Lang, Brussels, 1999, p. 104.
not considered here, since the aim of this article is not to provide guidelines to
individuals and firms on how to follow up their business transactions in euro.40
But regulation No. 974/98 embodies other provisions, which empower the States
to exercise some discretion. It is the case, in the first place, of the fourth
paragraph of Article 8, which allows the States to redenominate the public and
private debt in euro and enables markets and systems of payments to use the
euro in their operating procedures for the exchange, clearing and settlement in
the field of securities and commodities. Apart from this, the general principle
remains that other provisions can be adopted by the participating States only
within the "timeframe laid down by Community legislation".41
This means that each participating State can redenominate its outstanding debt
into euro during the transitional period. The majority of the participating States
have decided to do so. For example, this is the case of Austria, Belgium, France,
Germany, Italy (only for government securities denominated in LIT negotiable
on regulated markets)42 and Spain.43 (Austrian Report par. 2.3, Belgian Report
par. 2.1.2 b), French Report par. 2 II B) 2), Italian Report par. 2.1.4, Spanish
Report par. 1.3.2).
It is interesting enough to note that the notion of "redenomination" has been
used in a particularly narrow meaning: as explained in Art. 1 of Regulation
974/1998 "redenominate" means changing the unit of the amount of outstanding
debt from a national currency unit to the euro unit without altering any other
                                                          
40 See J.-V. LOUIS, supra note 39, pp. 12-13, according to whom the language used in
Art. 8, par. 3, "no es ciertamente de las más felices" and gives rise to questions concerning its
extension. For example, there are contrasts as to the inclusion of payments by checks in the
provision.
41 Art. 8, par. 5, of Regulation 974/98.
42 Art. 5, par. 1, of Legislative Decree No. 213.
43 For data not included in the National Reports, see MONETARY COMMITTEE, Debt
redenomination and market convention in stage III of EMU, in EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Euro
Papers, No. 28, July 1998, p. 10, especially Table 1.
term of the debt, "this being a matter subject to relevant national law". Thus
redenomination simply implies the mechanical operation of converting an
amount from one currency into another, in accordance with the rounding rules
established in Regulation 1153/1997, but it does not have the effect of
modifying any other terms of the debt, such as its nominal value. The
nominalistic principle has been recognised explicitly by Recital 14 of Regulation
1998, allowing the national law to alter the nominal amount of outstanding debt.
This means that a modification of the nominal amount of bonds will be only
possible if the law of the State governing the issue recognises this possibility.44
The redenomination of outstanding national debt has also a "waterfall" effect. In
fact it also allows other issuers of debt (such as bonds, securities negotiable in
the capital market and money market instruments) to do the same as long as they
are denominated in the currency of the State which has taken this initiative. The
only way to limit such right of the issuer is the agreement of both parties to
exclude it from the contract. Thus issuers of debt instruments denominated in
Belgian and French francs, Italian liras and Spanish pesetas, are allowed to
redenominate them in euro, subject to certain limitations.45
A supplementary scope of discretion is accorded to the participant States by Art.
15 of Regulation 974/98, according to which they are free to shorten the period
of double legal tender. The possibility of shortening has been favoured by the
Commission, which in May 1998 considered that a “period of 6 months for dual
circulation, the maximum foreseen […] is too long. There is a need for the
period of dual circulation to be as short as possible”.46 Recently such question
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section III of Law 2 July 1998; Italy: see Legislative Decree No. 213 of 24 June 1998,
especially Art. 11; Spain: see Law No. 46 of 1998, especially Arts. 16-22.
46 See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, DIRECTORATE GENERAL II - ECONOMIC AND
FINANCIAL AFFAIRS, From Round Table to Recommendations on practical aspects of the
introduction of the euro, Euro Papers, No. 23, May 1998, p. 34.
has gained a new impetus with the publication in July 1999 of a report where the
Commission proposed to the Member States to set a deadline of only a few
weeks. Such proposal was accepted by the participating member States at the
Ecofin Council of 8 November 1999. The States adopted a common declaration
and announced that they would take all the necessary measures to enable the
execution in euro of the bulk of cash transactions “by the end of a fortnight from
1 January 2002”.47 In the same occasion the States decided that the national
currencies would cease to be legal tender shortly after the end of the transitional
phase, within a period of four weeks and two months from 1 January 2002.
Germany has already declared that it will shorten the length of the period of dual
circulation. This country envisaged the possibility to reduce this time to zero, so
that the euro would have been the only legal means of payment from 1st January
2002 (“legal Big Bang”). However, after a discussion on the compatibility of
such decision with the word “shortening” used in Art. 15 of the regulation, the
deadline was partially modified. The transitional period of parallel circulation
(of DM and euro) was extended until 28 February 2002 for commerce, banks
and vending machines. The former deadline of January 1st was instead kept for
bank transfers, invoices and so on (“modified Big Bang”). As a consequence,
during this period of time vending machines, banks and shops will be allowed to
accept DM notes and coins. On the other hand, they will not be allowed to keep
these notes and coins but will have to cash them at the Landeszentralbanken (the
central banks of the German States) or any bank, if they are retailers. The only
exception are the vending machines, that will be still allowed to give change in
DM. This decision was adopted only after a ‘joint declaration’ of the
associations concerned, such as the vending machine industry and the retail and
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credit sector, dated 22 October 1998,48 and after the agreement on the modified
big-bang regulation (“modified deadline”).
1.3.2 Consequences of the Introduction of EC Euro Regulations on the
Domestic Legal Order: Some Controversial Aspects
As already said, the Member States can also elaborate internal rules to
complement the EC regulations, whenever needed implicitly, in order to
guarantee the efficacy and “effet utile” of the regulation. The approach chosen in
Madrid as confirmed by the euro Council regulations is minimalist; as already
seen Community provisions regarding the legal changeover to the common
currency have dictated only few essential principles leaving up to the States the
task of enacting more detailed legislation so as to solve problems likely to show
up during the introduction of the new currency.49 For example, the EC
legislation does not give any indication either on the techniques to be used
whenever States decide to redenominate the public and private debt, or on the
parameters for monetary revaluation of legal instruments.50 Furthermore, the EC
legislation explicitly requires supplementary measures to "ensure a balanced
changeover, in particular for consumers": even though such provision was
intended to refer to Community measures, it also has an indirect impact on
national legislation as such measures should be introduced by the States in the
internal order.51
The National Reports show that all the States have been aware of the important
role they had been called to play in this respect. Most of them have put up
special task forces willing to individuate the major fields of intervention and to
filter and "clean" the entire legal system so that provisions in contrast with the
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50 G.L. TOSATO, L'unione economica e monetaria e l'euro, Giappichelli, Torino, 1999,
p. 104.
51 Recital 1 of Regulation 974/1998.
EC legislation can be eliminated. This is the approach followed mainly by
Austria. This country considered the necessity of adopting the regulations on
euro as the occasion to reform other fields of legislation, for reasons of clarity
and legal certainty. A working group called "Legistik", charged with listing all
the legal provisions to be adjusted to the new phase, was established dealing
with the legal framework of the changeover. According to this approach, every
provision has to be changed individually and not through a general amendment
(Austrian Report par. 2.1). A wide range reform of private law, centred on
company law and continuity of contracts, was carried out accordingly.
Provisions on continuity of contracts enshrined in Regulation No. 1153/1997
have been the source of vivid internal debates concentrating on the validity of
legal instruments under the new scenario. As a matter of fact, all the National
Reports agree that in 1999 no proceedings or case-law on issues concerning the
euro have been initiated or handed down due to the early stage. However some
of them stress that in the future the majority of cases will be originated by the
provisions on continuity of contracts, for their conflict with some general
principles of law, such as the monetary equivalence rule (Greek Report par.
2.1.2) or some contractual clauses such as force majeure and supervening
excessive hardship (Italian Report par. 2.2.1). Also, for some part of the
doctrine, there may be cases when a continuation of the contract would be in
violation of the necessity of it having a cause.52 It is the case of currency swaps,
i.e. those agreements consisting in the exchange of one security for another and
used by corporations and financial institutions to hedge against changes in
interest and foreign exchange rates, even though it is true that other authors have
rejected such objection53 (Italian Report par. 2.2.1). Finally, it should not be
                                                          
52 R. RONFINI, Gli effetti giuridici dell'euro, Cedam, 1998, p. 89.
53 The compatibility of swaps with the principle of continuity of contracts is supported
for example by the Commission. According to this view, a cross currency interest rate swap,
concerning two currencies of member States participating to EMU is not invalid but it is
simply transformed into an obligation of one party to make a series of net payments to its
forgotten that the principle of continuity of contracts is granted subject to
anything which parties may have agreed.
This kind of problem appears more acute in Mediterranean countries, such as
Greece, Italy and Spain, maybe due to the lack of a certain body of precedents,
as appears in the Greek Report (Greek Report par. 2.1.2). In these countries the
fear has been expressed that an alteration of the balance between creditor and
debtor in favour of the latter could occur, mostly in fixed interest rates contracts.
This problem has been solved in Belgium for consumer protection purposes with
a legislation forbidding the seller to alter or terminate unilaterally the contract
because of the introduction of the euro (Belgian Report par. 2.1.2 b)).54
Similarly and on a more general level, the Spanish legislation has abolished the
possibility to have recourse to court on the ground of the substitution of pesetas
into euro (Spanish Report par. 1.3.1).55 In Spain such provision has been the
source of some criticism; not only for the prolixity of the text chosen that
specifies every single possibility of alteration of the contract, but also for the
existence of Art. 24 of the Constitution granting an effective judicial protection
to individuals. According to the Spanish rapporteur, private persons and entities
                                                                                                                                                                                    
counterparty. As for contracts where the only purpose is to cover an exchange rate risk (which
has become non-existent because the currencies in the swap have become permanently fixed),
the introduction of the euro does not make them invalid, if we take the view that such fixed
parity was one of the risks that the parties had taken by drafting such a contract. Another
justification is that such permanent fixed parity was well foreseeable in most contracts. See
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, DIRECTORATE GENERAL II - ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL AFFAIRS,
The legal framework for the use of the euro. Questions and answers on the euro regulations,
Euro Papers, No. 10, December 1997, p. 11.
54 Art. 54 of the “Euro Law” of 30.10.1998.
55 Art. 10 of Law No. 46/1998. According to this Article "la sustitución de la peseta
por el euro no constituye un hecho jurídico con efectos modificativos, extintivos, revocatorios,
rescisorios o resolutorios en el cumplimiento de las obligaciones y que dicha sustitución no
exime ni excusa del cumplimiento de las obligaciones vigentes ni autoriza la alteración
unilateral de su contenido, salvo pacto expreso en contrario de las partes".
would have been better protected if the legislator had copied the text of Art. 3 of
Regulation No. 1103/1997 and not specified the various cases of application.
On the contrary, problems seem to be minimal in countries that have more
tradition of case-law on currency reforms. In  Austria, for instance, several
currency reforms (dealing also with the phenomenon of hyperinflation) have
taken place and a consistent case-law acknowledges that the burden of risk
should be borne by creditor. If this is true for currency reforms, it is all the more
true in the present case, which is a mere currency conversion  (i.e. only a change
in the denomination). According to the Austrian Report, the system of private
law, which has been restated for reasons of clarity, was already in line with the
EC principles (Austrian Report par. 2.3).
1.3.3 Spaces Left to the Intervention of the States: Tendencies in National
Law
States are left free to regulate the changeover in the way they deem appropriate
in the areas left aside by the two EC regulations. In this respect the States have
been recognised a freedom of action with the only non-binding limitations
deriving from the several acts adopted by the European Communities. This is
the case of the already mentioned recommendations adopted by the Commission
in 1998 and other acts enacted by different Directorates General of the same
institution, concerning accountancy rules and rounding.56
States can therefore approve rules on corporations, such as accountancy and
redenomination of capital rules; on public administration, such as income
declarations; and on protection of creditors and consumers, such as publication
of prices in euro as well as in the national currency.
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EUROPEAN COMMISSION, DGII, Introduction of the euro and rounding of monetary amounts,
in ABI, Codice dell'euro. Normativa comunitaria e nazionale e commenti dell'ABI, Bancaria
editrice, 1998, p. 131.
The approach chosen by the States conforms with the "no prohibition, no
compulsion" approach. Thus, balance-sheets of enterprises can be usually be
published either in euro or in a national currency and the same applies to the
conversion of the capital of enterprises (Austrian Report par. 2.3, Belgian Report
par. 2.1.2 b), French Report par. II A), German Report par. 2.1, Italian Report
par. 2.1.4); sometimes income and VAT declarations can also be established in
euro (Belgian Report par. 2.1.2 a)57, Italian Report par. 2.1.458) while in some
cases income declarations in euro are not permitted (French Report par. 2 II
D)59, German Report par. 3.260). In Spain, the legislator has explicitly stated that
conversion payments should be made for free (Spanish Report par. 1.3.2)61.
What is more interesting is that in some cases also non-participating countries
are using the euro as a parallel currency. This is the case of Sweden, where the
balance sheet of enterprises can be drawn either in euro or in Swedish kronor.
As for accounting, a new law, passed in March 2000, recognised that it must be
entirely either in euro or in kronor, although taxes are always to be paid in
kronor, according to special conversion tables (Swedish Report par. 2.1.1). This
odd situation can give rise to some fiscal problems mostly if multinationals
decide to draft their accounts in euro so that tax authorities should be forced to
deal with payments in two different currencies linked by a floating exchange
                                                          
57 See Royal Decree of 15 December 1998.
58 In Italy amounts of income declarations can be shown in euro from 1 January 1999
and creditors may request payments from government in euro if a payment by cash is not
involved. This principle, however explicitly stated, is a consequence of Regulation No.
974/1998.
59In France income declarations in euro are forbidden; it is possible however to pay
taxes in euro. See Titre III of Law No. 98-546 of 2 July 1998.
60 In Germany income declarations are drawn in DM, while amounts in euro are given
for information.
61 Art 15 of Law 12/1998 of 28 April 1998, entered into force on 1 January 1999.
rate. This is the reason why it is predictable that in Sweden the question of the
use of the euro will rise to public debate before 2002.
1.4 Redundancies in Legislation
Some States have raised the question of what method should be used in drafting
the legislative reform both of the national central banks and on the introduction
of the euro (for a summary of the main legislative acts adopted on the
introduction of the euro and their legal form, see Table 1). On the one hand,
there are modifications required by the parameters of legal convergence on the
independence of the national central banks and their integration into the ESCB
imposed to the Member States by Art. 109 (ex Art. 108) of the Treaty. On the
other hand, reforms have been clearly promoted by the two Council Regulations
on the introduction of the euro.
It should be clear from the beginning that a standard method of adaptation does
not exist, as neither the Treaty nor the statute require a harmonisation of national
legislation.62 National legislators are simply bound to the principle of direct
applicability and supremacy of Community law in adopting domestic provisions
on the introduction of the euro and the institutional modifications required to
enter the third phase of EMU. This is all the more clear if we consider the report
published by the “forefather” of the ECB, the European Monetary Institute
(EMI) in October 1997, where it appreciates the status of the domestic
legislation of the Member States and evaluates its compatibility with the dictates
of the Treaty without, however, imposing a single solution for realising such
adaptation. The EMI limits itself to highlight the points of the internal legal
                                                          
62 On the lack of harmonisation of national legislation for the adaptation to the Treaty,
see J.-V. LOUIS, Monnaie (Union économique et monétaire), in “Répertoire communautaire
Dalloz”, février 2000, p. 10.
framework that are judged in contrast with the requirements of Stage three of
EMU, but it does not suggest a one-way solution.
These observations promote further considerations, based on the different kind
of legal sources which are at the basis of the reform of the currency and of the
national central banks (the content of such reform will be examined infra, par.
2). The incorrect drafting of an internal act aimed at introducing the euro in the
domestic legal order, consisting for example in the manipulation of the EC
regulations, can give rise to relevant problems for its contrast with the EC
monetary regulations, given their direct applicability in the Member States.
These obstacles on the contrary do not exist for the reform of central bank
statutes, which does not require the harmonisation of national laws.
The question of the technical adaptations that are legally necessary for entering
stage three of EMU has been discussed mainly in Belgium, Austria, Spain and
Greece. In France as well some debates have taken place, the outcome of which
is the inclusion of provisions on the introduction of the new currency in one
single piece of legislation.
A specific approach has been followed in Belgium. In this country the Council
of State has criticised the legislative draft on the reform of the statute of the
National Bank of Belgium prepared by the Belgian Government for having
reproduced directly applicable provisions of the Treaty and the Statute, and has
judged it redundant; according to the Council it would have been sufficient to
introduce some general provisions making reference directly to EC law. For
example, in the Council's words, it was enough to state that "the National Bank
of Belgium shall form an integral part of the European System of Central Banks
and it shall be governed by… the Statute of the European System of Central
Banks ". As a consequence the Belgian Government decided to change the
wording of the draft, incorporating the provisions of the Statute of the ESCB on
the tasks, objectives and features.63 This is also the method followed, for
example, by the Italian legislator, which makes reference to the relevant
provisions of the EC Treaty and EC regulations without restating their content
(Italian Report par. 2.2.2).
A different approach has been followed by the Austrian decision-making bodies:
the working group "Legistik", established for the changeover, has been working
on the assumption that a general amendment to internal legislation is not enough
and that, as a consequence, every single provision in contrast with EC legislation
on EMU should be modified individually. As a result, the text of many of the
new provisions is similar to those of the Treaty, even word by word (Austrian
Report par. 2.2).
An effort of systematisation on the subject has also been made in Spain, where
EC euro legislation has been implemented via a general legal act enshrining
general principles: the Law No. 46/1998 ("ley paraguas") complemented by
national regulations and acts adopted by some of the Comunidades Autonomas
within their jurisdiction aimed at explaining the use of the euro in their
administrative and financial affairs. The techniques adopted by the Spanish
legislator in drafting the legislation have been criticised for some modifications
introduced in the text of the EC Treaty and the Statute  of the ESCB. Such
application of EC law in the national order is contrary to the case-law of the
Court of Justice, because it contradicts the dictates of EC legislation to which
the States are obliged to conform. A better way of proceeding would have been
to follow the example of Belgium and to include a reference to Community law
in the national legislation. Or, instead, to reproduce literally the provisions of the
Treaty, in the Austrian way, provided that the origin of the texts is made very
clear, even though such type of proceedings can be justified only for the
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PAPERS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, No. 1061/1, 96/97, 4 June 1997.
legislative reforms on the national central banks and not for the euro legislation
that has legal consequences directly on citizens.
Some other problems derive from the unclear division between the powers that
the Bank of Spain has on its own, and the functions it exercises as a member of
the System of Central Banks. Given the different limitations to which the two
types of functions are subjects, in accordance with Art. 14 of the Statute, this
unclear division can be the source of a questionable interpretation of the Statute
of the Bank of Spain. In fact, the national central banks, as members of the
ESCB, are mere "operating arms" of the ECB; on the contrary they are
completely free in their action if they exercise different functions, with the limit
of not interfering with the objectives and tasks of the ESCB (Art. 14 of the
ESCB Statute; Spanish Report par. 1.2.1).
Finally, also Greece has taken a stance that is similar to the Austrian. The Greek
legislator has not only considered the adoption of EC legislation on EMU as an
occasion for a wider review of relevant legislation, but it has also rejected an
approach based on a general piece of legislation abolishing incompatible
provisions if not followed by a contemporary identification of such invalid acts.
This thoughtful attitude taken by Greek political powers vis-à-vis the
institutional arrangements of EMU and its adaptation within the national order
shows their interest to join the union as soon as possible. As a matter of fact, the
exclusion of Greece from the first wave of countries members of EMU was
dictated only by economic factors and not by a lack of adaptation to the
Community legislation (clearly this appreciation refers only to the reform of the
Bank of Greece and not to the euro legislation, which is not a parameter of legal
convergence).64
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Table 1 - Main National Legal Provisions on EMU and Procedures of
Adaptation
STATES MAIN NATIONAL LEGAL
PROVISIONS ON EMU
PROCEDURES OF  ADAPTATION
AUSTRIA Central Bank Statute
Nationalbankgesetz [Central Bank Act],
BGBl I No. 60/1998
• The text of the new provisions is
very similar to that of the EC Treaty
and ESCB Statute, even literally
  Introduction of the euro
 Private Law Amendments
• Refusal of a general amendment:
every provision in violation with EC
legislation ARE modified
individually
• Many legislative changes do not
relate directly to euro but to other
fields, for reasons of legal certainty
• Each federal Minister is responsible
for the process of adaptation within
its sphere of jurisdiction
 BELGIUM  Central Bank Statute
 Law of 22 February 1998 (The New
Organic Law of the National Bank of
Belgium)
 
• Legislative power exercised by
Government
• A first draft of the law had been
criticised by the Belgian Conseil
d'Etat for reproducing provisions of
both the EC Treaty and the ESCB
Statute. Such opinion led the
Belgian Government to delete those
provisions that were a mere
reproduction of Community law. As
a result, the new law states the
objectives, tasks, and other
characters of the National Bank of
Belgium through direct reference to
the articles of the EC Treaty and the
ESCB Statute
  Introduction of the euro
 Law of 30 October 1998
 (Law on the introduction of the euro)
• Legislative changes in various fields
deriving from the introduction of the
euro have been concentrated in one
single act
 FRANCE  Central Bank Statute
 Law 93-980 of 4 August 1993 (Statute of
Bank of France)
 Law 98-357 of 12 May 1998 (Insertion
of the Bank of France into the ESCB)
• Law 93-980 grants the Bank of
France a degree of independence and
defines the stability of prices as its
main objective
• Law 98-357 transfers monetary
policy to the ESCB; change policy
to the Council of the EU; modifies
the role of the Bank of France for
the payments  system
  Introduction of the euro
 Law No. 546 of 2 July 1998
(introduction of the euro)
• This is a general piece of legislation
“portant diverses dispositions
d’ordre économique et financier”.
Only Chapter II of this act enshrines
the adaptations to the new currency.
Such chapter establishes the various
legislative modifications necessary
for the changeover (capital and debt
instruments redenomination,
continuity of contracts, etc.)
 GERMANY  Central Bank Statute
 Reform of the Statute of the
Bundesbank Act (Sechstes Gesetz
zur Änderung des Gesetzes über
die Deutsche Bundesbank, in:
Bundesgesetzblatt 1997, part I,
No. 88, 30 December 1997, p.
3274-3275) of 22 December 1997
• Only specific amendments
  Introduction of the euro
 Law of 9 June 1998 (accounting law,
debt enforcement proceedings)
 Law of 24 March 1999 (social security
and administration): in force
retrospectively from 1 January 1999
 Law of 16 December 1998 (notes and
coins, definite introduction of the euro
cash)
• The Legislation on the introduction
of the euro is quite detailed. The
intent of the national legislator has
been to bring any national provisions
in conflict with the EC euro
regulations into line, to guarantee
complete clarity
• Relevant problems linked to the
federal structure of Germany
 GREECE  Central Bank Statute
 Law No. 2609 of 1998 (independence of
the Bank of Greece)
• Fulfilment of legal convergence
criteria notwithstanding the status of
State with a derogation
• General legal act abolishing
incompatible provisions
complemented by an identification
of such invalid acts
 ITALY  Central Bank Statute
 Legislative Decree No. 385 of 1993
 Law No. 483 of 26 November 1993
 Law No. 433 of 17 December 1997
(delegation to Government):
 Legislative Decree No. 43 of 10 October
1998
 
• Law 483 of 1993 forbids the Bank of
Italy to grant any advance to the
Ministry of the Treasury and gives it
all the decision power for the
compulsory reserve
• Leg.ve decree 43 of 1998 states that
the Bank of Italy is an integral part
of the ESCB and acts in conformity
with the instructions of the ECB
  Introduction of the euro
 Law No. 433 of 17 December 1997
(delegation to Government):
 Legislative Decree No. 213 of 24 June
1998
 Legislative Decree No. 206 of 15 June
1999
• Law of delegation 433 of 1997
establishes the following general
principles that have to be followed
by Government: continuity of legal
instruments and legal relations,
neutrality of the transition to the
single currency, full information on
transition rules, gradual transition to
the single currency
 PORTUGAL  Central Bank Statute
 Decree-Law 235/1995
 Law No. 3 of 5 February 1996
 Law No. 5 of 31 January 1998
• See Table 1 of Portuguese Report
  Introduction of the euro
 Decree-Law 138/1998
 Decree-Law 343/1998
• See Table 1 of Portuguese Report
 SPAIN  Central Bank Statute
 Law No. 13 of 1 June 1994
(independence of the Bank of Spain from
government)
 Law No. 12 of 28 April 1998 (integration
of the Bank of Spain into the ESCB)
• Law 13 of 1994 transfers monetary
policy to the Bank of Spain and
guarantees its independence
• Law 12 of 1998 integrates the Bank
of Spain into the ESCB
  Introduction of the euro
 Law No. 46 of 1998 ("Ley paraguas")
 Various regulations
 Legislation of Comunidades Autonomas
• Adaptation via a general act with
legal principles complemented by
regulations and acts of the
Comunidades Autonomas
• Criticism for the drafting of Law 46
of 1998 for the reproduction of EC
legislation with some modifications:
problems of redundancy
 SWEDEN  Central Bank Statute
 Law No. 1385 of 1988 (Riksbank Law)
• The procedure has not been
completed yet
2.  The Statutes of the National Central Banks
The National Reports agree that the major legislative adaptations required by the
EC Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB have consisted in the modification of the
State’s central bank statutes. These parameters of legal convergence have been
dictated directly by primary law, and have been considered as the necessary
preconditions for Member States to accede to the third stage of EMU.65 This is
especially true for those States lacking a tradition of independent central banks,
such as France and Italy, Belgium, Spain and Portugal (although their degree of
independence varies), but it is also true for those which historically have
enjoyed a higher grade of independence from the political powers, legally or de
facto, such as Germany and The Netherlands.66
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CONLLEDO LANTERO, Las reformas legislativas que la Unión Económica y Monetaria exige
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66 For a measurement of the central bank independence from a legal and economic
point of view before the central banks statutes were adapted to the requirements of the ESCB
Statute, See BRIAULT - HALDANE - KING, Central Bank independence and accountability:
theory and evidence, in “Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin”, February 1996, p. 63.
According to these authors, the central banks of Italy, Sweden and France enjoyed a low level
of independence while the central banks of Belgium and Spain were in a middle position. The
highest degree of independence was traditionally acknowledged to the central banks of
Germany and Switzerland. In the middle position was also the Bank of The Netherlands and
the Federal Reserve System, although enjoying a greater degree of independence than those of
Belgium and Spain. The Bank of England, finally, was lying at the lowest spectrum of the
graphic. The requirements of legal convergence established by Art. 14 of the ESCB Statute
and Art. 109 (ex Art. 108A) of the EC Treaty, requiring that each State is responsible for the
compatibility of domestic legislation with the obligations of legal independence, has of course
changed this state of affairs. A new updated indicator for central bank independence has been
drawn up taking into account such  reforms. According to this the central bank with the
greater degree of independence, in addition to the ECB, remains the Bundesbank (5 scores)
2.1 Problems of Constitutional Legitimacy
One of the conditions for member States to be accepted as members of EMU
was the obedience to the parameters of legal convergence fleshed out in the
ESCB Statute.
At first sight, a modification of the Statute of the Bundesbank may seem
superfluous: according to the common view, the Bundesbank Act has served as
the blueprint for the ECB! However, as pointed out in the German Report, the
factors of independence required by the ESCB Statute for the national central
banks are even stricter than those of the Bundesbank. It is sufficient here to
remind that, before the 1997 reform, the Bundesbank Act acknowledged to the
members of the Federal Government the power to defer the decisions of the
Central Bank Council for up to two weeks (German Report par. 2).
Probably the most difficult process of adaptation has taken place in France and
Portugal, where the approval of the reforms on central bank independence has
given rise to problems of constitutional legitimacy. Before the introduction of
the reform by Law 93-980 of 4 August 1993 the Bank of France was a political
body lacking personal and functional independence. The first indication of a
change was the modification of the provision of the Statute that granted the
Government the power to remove the Governor and the two vice-Governors
from their position without the formulation of an explicit reason; the new
formula allows a removal only for "faute grave" and "incapacité d'exercice des
fonctions".67 The second radical transformation is linked to functional
independence. Before the reform, according to Art. 4 of Law No. 73-7 of 3
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“Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, Quarterly Review”, June 1999, p. 189.
67 Art. 10 of Law 4 August 1993.
January 1973 the Bank of France had the clear political task of "préparer et
participer à la mise en oeuvre de la politique monétaire arrêtée par le
gouvernement". We do not need a lot of rhetoric to emphasise the modifications
already introduced by Art. 1 of Law No. 93-980, according to which the Bank
was charged with "définir et mettre en oeuvre la politique monétaire dans le but
d'assurer la stabilité des prix".
The question of constitutional legitimacy was originated by the difficult
insertion into the French legal system of a provision, such as the one that we
have just mentioned, which is in contrast with the main principles of a semi-
presidential system. From a Constitutional point of view, France is a country
where all the political power is concentrated on the hands of the Government.68
The power of the two chambers of Parliament is reduced to some sectors
established by the Constitution while Government exercises all the (extensive)
residual power via regulations. It is the Executive that - in consultation with the
President of the Republic that should be compulsorily consulted by the Prime
Minister in the exercise of his functions - decides and executes the major
political decisions of the nation and is responsible for the whole administration.
Such government-centred  system could not be farther from the principles of
"horizontal" and "non-hierarchical" administration required by an independent
central bank. This is the reason why the Conseil Constitutionnel, in its decision
of August 1993 on the constitutional validity of the law that laid down the new
statute of the Bank of France, ruled such reform unconstitutional as it could not
be enacted before the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty. The provisions
of the Constitution at the origin of the contrast were Articles 20 and 21, i.e.
those indicating the core principles of a semi-presidential system, according to
which it is up to the Government to decide and carry out the politics of the
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Nation and it is to the Prime Minister to direct it. As the French Conseil
Constitutionnel exercises, if requested, a control a priori on the text of legal acts
before they enter into force, it decided that such a transfer of monetary power
from the Government to the central bank could not be justified on the solely
basis of Art. 88, par. 2, of the Constitution: this article acknowledges the transfer
of power from the State to the European Union on the basis of the Treaty of
Maastricht, but it was not in force at that time. It would have been necessary to
wait until this article was in force to justify the reform.69 The provision has been
modified in 1998.
Also the Bank of Portugal underwent a major process of change; as explicated
by the Portuguese Report, "initially a public owned company, the Portuguese
Central Bank is now a special legal entity governed by public law and enjoying
administrative and financial autonomy" (Portuguese Report par. 2.1). But it is
the requirements on the functional independence that were the source of major
criticism and the reason of a Constitutional amendment concerning the Bank of
Portugal functions. Since 1997 Art. 102 of the Portuguese Constitution has been
changed into a more flexible text in order to put the central bank functions in
line with the dictates of the Maastricht Treaty. From that year on the new text of
the Constitution reads as follows: "the Bank of Portugal, in its capacity as a
central bank, shall carry out its functions in accordance with the law and with
the international rules to which the Portuguese State is bound".
An interesting evolution is taking place also in Sweden, a country where the
statute of the central bank is regulated directly by the Constitution. Although
formally out from EMU, this country is not only adopting the euro as a parallel
currency but it has also passed a piece of legislation aimed at strengthening the
independence of the Swedish central bank. As a consequence, a constitutional
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69 See Decision No. 93-324 of 3 August 1993, in JORF 5/6/1993, p. 11014.
reform has taken place in order to harmonise the Constitution with the rules of
the ESCB Statute. Although this Constitutional reform has already entered into
force on January 1, 1999, it is not sufficiently large to put in line the Swedish
central bank with the requirements of independence required by the Maastricht
Treaty. That is why a new Constitutional reform, eliminating the monopolistic
power of the central bank in the fields of monetary policy and the issue of notes
and coins, is deemed necessary before Sweden decides to join the third stage of
EMU.70
Lastly, it is interesting to remember that also Austria passed a Constitutional
reform related to EMU; however, it was not connected to the statute of the
central bank but to the Stability Pact.71 This relevant decision, which deals with
problems of co-ordination among the various levels of governance inside the
State, has already been discussed by Prof. J.-V. Louis in the introduction and
does not need further investigations. Also, it should not been forgotten the
judgement of the German Constitutional Court on the more general problem of
adhesion to Germany to the European Union. Although it makes reference also
to the provisions on EMU, the German High Court has upheld its constitutional
validity.
2.2 Accountability of the Central Banks: a Tradition of the Northern Countries?
One of the most debated questions on the status of central banks is that of
accountability. The reason for such discussion is clear: more independence on
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legal terms can be justified only in an open and transparent context where the
decisions taken by the central banks are subject to discussion and open criticism
from the democratically-elected institutions. The expressions “independence”
and “accountability” are usually considered as opposite concepts in the
description of the relationship between the central bank and the elected
institutions. However in legal terms this is not so, on the condition of
considering the word "accountability" as a synonym of the terms
"responsibility" and "liability": i.e. "the condition of being actually or
potentially subject to an obligation", or the "condition which creates a duty to
perform an act immediately or in the future", or, finally, "the state of one who is
bound in law and justice to do something which may be enforced by action".72 If
such concept were only based on the existence of a legal basis whose
infringement  brings about judicial control, the fact of the ECB being subject to
the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice would be already sufficient to
justify its independence.
However, such vague definitions take into account only some partial and civil
aspects of the concept of institutional accountability, while legal theory makes
reference to other concepts such as those of "democratic responsibility" and
"democratically elected institutions", that explicit the connection between one
institution and the electorate (or its representatives). This being so, the
accountability of a central bank is determined, in the first place, by its enabling
act, which is usually an act of delegation from the Parliament. But this act - that
for the ECB consists in a Treaty- does not replace the need for an institutional
check, mostly from the legislative and executive branches. Powerful
parliaments, such as that of the United States, can investigate an independent
central bank either through its own hearing and subpoena power or through its
auditing and investigative arm, while the executive power can exert his control
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through various instruments, such as the appointment and termination of agency
officials and the supervision of its rule-making authority.73
In addition, this arrangement should be coupled with means capable of assuring
an effective transparency so that external controllers can have a full and
comprehensible picture of the reasons at the basis of the central bank decisions.
This is why this kind of accountability is usually coupled with effective channels
of communicating the main political decisions to external audiences; useful
instruments in this respect are the publication of the minutes of the meetings and
decisions taken, as well as of the reports on different economic indicators, such
as the inflation target.
All the National Reports deal with the question of accountability, though to a
different extent. EC provisions do not impose strict obligations in this respect so
that internal legislation is still very different from a State to another. As a matter
of fact, the Statute of the ESCB requires only that the mandate of the Governor
of the national central bank cannot be inferior to five years and that he can be
removed only for serious misconduct or for not fulfilling anymore the conditions
required for the performance of his duties.74 Other requirements imposing
reporting duties concern exclusively the ECB and not national central banks.
The most interesting National Reports in this respect are perhaps those
concentrating on two countries which, not surprisingly, have decided to stay out
from EMU: Sweden and UK. At the other side of the accountability spectrum
lies Austria, which, according to the National Reports, has no reporting
requirements to Parliament.
In Sweden the Governor is not only obliged to appear before the Parliament
(Riksdag) three or four times a year but it should also present the profit & loss
accounts and balance-sheet. The Parliament is responsible for its approval at the
                                                          
73 W. F. FOX, Understanding Administrative Law, 3rd edition, Matthew Bender, New
York, 1997,  pp. 31 and 67.
74 Art. 14.2 and Art. 14.3.
end of the financial year. But the most powerful tool in the hands of the Riksdag
is the power of discharging the Governing Board of the central bank for cause.
Finally, the central bank submits the Annual Report to the Riksdag and to
parliamentary auditors. The authority of the Swedish Parliament is strong
indeed, notwithstanding the amendments that have been introduced in the late
'90s granting more independence to the central bank. The Swedish system has
also other interesting features related to its tradition of "openness": the central
bank has in the last few years adopted an explicit inflation target and has also
communicated its analysis of the economy to the financial markets (Swedish
Report par. 1.2).
Given all that, it is not surprising that in Sweden the major point under
discussion in financial circles and public opinion is the lack of transparency of
the EU bureaucracy and of the ECB altogether. They criticise the ECB because
they judge its behaviour and its vision of the European economy as difficult to
understand, and because they cannot have recourse to historic records, as they
do for the Federal Reserve, given that a reasoned evaluation cannot be based on
less than two-year old data.
Also the UK Report has at its core the question of accountability. The Bank of
England is considered in economic circles as the most accountable central bank
of Europe.75 This is explained by the high number of reports delivered by the
Bank: a first report to Parliament with its accounts for the previous year, a
second report also to Parliament describing its behaviour in banking supervision,
a quarterly inflation report on the results obtained in reaching the inflation rate
established by the government and its previsions in reaching the inflation target
for the future.76 These reports, mostly the third on inflation target, are heavy
burden for the Bank, and have a great impact on elected bodies. These
obligations of the Bank should be added to the frequent appearance of the
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Governor in front of the Parliamentary committees, although its impact is
diminished by the observation that the Bank does not stand alone in front of the
Parliament, but through the intermediary of the Chancellor of the Exchequer or
another Treasury Minister. The Bank of England has also reached a good record
of transparency, mostly due to the announcement of the quantitative
Government inflation target and the publication of the minutes of the meetings
between the Chancellor and the Governor where the policy on interest rate is
decided. Another important tool to ensure a good degree of transparency is the
publication of the minutes of the Monetary Policy Committee, which are
released on the Wednesday of the second week after the meeting takes place.
The Bank of England Act of 1998 has entrusted the Monetary Policy Committee
with the responsibility of setting interest rates on the basis of the Government’s
inflation target.77
It is noteworthy that transparency and legitimacy are the issues that have
inspired most of the criticism on the acceptance of the euro in the English public
opinion and informed commentators. A secretive and only partially accountable
system such as that of the ECB is hardly acceptable - argues for example Prof.
Buiter, expressing the view of most of the English academic world - because it
will hardly survive the unavoidable failures of the system.78 Such framework,
                                                          
77 Id. The minutes of the meetings of the Monetary Policy Committee are visible also
in the web-site of the Bank of England, at the following address:
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/.
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decisions" and "considers it necessary, in the interests of transparency and credibility, that
the ESCB should make it clear how monetary policy is intended, over and above the objective
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AFFAIRS AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY, Resolution on the annual report for 1998 of the European
characterised by an excessive degree of rigidity and lack of openness, will not be
able to evolve in a true political unit and will be subject to crisis of legitimacy
should an economic crisis, such an asymmetric shock, intervene. This
interpretation, based on economic reasoning, highlights the difficulty of
justifying the decision of the ECB not to publish the minutes of the committees
and the Council for fear that the members coming from the national central
banks would not be free to support the interests of the euro-zone as a whole
should they be in conflict with the national interest (UK Report par. 3.2).
One important institutional dialogue with both the Parliament and the
Government exist in Spain, where the Bank of Spain has the obligation to report
on the objectives and the implementation of monetary policy and to publish
every year the objectives of monetary policy for the year with the
implementation methods. Also the budget should be submitted to Parliament for
approval (although the parliamentary consent is not binding). In addition to that,
the Governor may be required to attend the meetings of the Fiscal and Finance
Policy Council, a co-ordinating body gathering the representatives of central and
regional governments (Spanish Report par. 1.2).
Also in Greece, a country where the question of the independence and
accountability of the central bank has been highly debated in the political arena
under the aegis of "Can we have a democracy without a demos?" there is a
dialogue with the Parliament: one parliamentary committee is competent for
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expressing his opinion regarding the suitability of the candidates for the
appointment as governors and the central bank is obliged to publish its annual
report and the financial statements (Greek Report par. 1.3.3).79
We can thus conclude on the question of accountability of central banks
recognising that all the States under observation have modified the statute of
their central banks, enhancing their independence vis-à-vis the political powers
and eliminating external influences, but keeping at the same time their reporting
commitments and sometimes even reinforcing them, as in the case of the Bank
of England.
In some cases, these powers of control by political institutions have merely been
transferred from euro-related areas to non euro-related areas within the same
central bank. We can take the example of the French "Conseil de la politique
monétaire", entrusted with the task of explaining to the nation the monetary
policy carried out by the ESCB, which has been kept only for functions
unrelated to the ESCB. The maintenance of this council has been justified by the
French reporter on the ground that the Senate acknowledged the importance of
this body for the democratic legitimacy of the Bank of France (French Report
par. I.A)). More generally, it cannot be denied that it is sometimes difficult to
eliminate bodies that have played an important role in the past, but which have
now lost some of their justification. We can also take the example of Belgium,
where Law of 22 March 1993 had already restricted the large power of the
Minister for Finance to resist the execution of the measures adopted by the Bank
that were thought contrary to the law, statutes or interests of the State, as well as
the right of the Government Commissioner to suspend the decisions of the
                                                          
79 The phrase reported was pronounced by Tsoukalis, professor at the Athens
University and former counsellor of prime minister Papandreou, as specified in the Greek
Report par. 1.3.3.
On the reporting requirements of the Bank of Greece, see also EUROPEAN MONETARY
INSTITUTE, supra note 63, p. 17.
National Bank if contrary to the same parameters. Such power, whose exercise
had been limited to the existence of legal grounds by the reform of 1993, has
now been restricted exclusively to non-ESCB related tasks of the Bank (Belgian
Report par. 2.1.3). Finally, we can make reference to the case of Spain, where
the above-mentioned Fiscal and Financial Policy Council, entrusted with the
task of taking rules on financial discipline for regional governments, has been
set up with a jurisdiction centred on non monetary policy issues.
3.   Public Opinion and Institutional Features
The National Reports explain the different attitudes towards the euro using a
dynamic and country-oriented approach. In some States, for example, the level
of acceptance of the euro can be found in the low degree of confidence in
national governments, such as in Belgium, Greece and Italy, where the euro tend
to be considered as a remedy to internal evils (Belgian Report par. 1.2.1); in
some other States it can be identified in the pride put on the national currency, as
in Germany (German Report - introduction); in others it may reside in the
enthusiastic support towards the European integration process, such as in Italy
and Spain (Italian Report par. 1.1; Spanish Report par. 2.1). These results
largely coincide with those suggested by other studies, based on different types
of approaches. This is for example the case of the Müller-Peters-Papermans-
Kiell Report, which builds up a map of pro/against euro countries based on
psychological factors.80
                                                          
80 MÜLLER-PETERS-PAPERMANS-KIELL, The psychology of the EMU. A cross-national
study of the attitudes towards the euro, IAREP, International Association for Research in
Economic Psychology, Journal of Economic Psychology. This paper can be consulted at the
following web address: http://www.wiso.uni-koeln.de/wisopsy/forschung/euro/. This report
puts forward other factors that can have an influence on the public opinion on the euro, such
as the high level of national patriotism (in Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Austria and
Greece), and the pride states put on cultural and historical symbols (mostly Italy).
They also coincide by far and large with the data of the Eurobarometer research.
This paragraph will accordingly refer to them (even though they are limited to a
short period of time, i.e. autumn 1999) as they describe the state of the opinion
at an aggregate level in all the member States, making it possible a cross-country
comparison.81 According to the Eurobarometer data, traditionally euro-sceptic
countries are UK, Denmark and Sweden (correspondingly, only 25%, 42% and
43% of the public opinion in favour of the euro) whilst euro-enthusiastic
countries are Italy (85% of public opinion in favour of the euro), Luxembourg
(79%), Ireland (78%) and Belgium (77 %). Countries with a positive attitude
towards the euro coincide usually with those favouring the European Union as a
whole, even though there are some exceptions, as shown by Belgium where the
public opinion has welcomed well the introduction of the euro notwithstanding a
medium degree of acceptance of European integration (Belgian Report par.
1.2.1).
It could be interesting from a political/legal point of view to see if the degree of
acceptance of the ECB model (and its degree of accountability) has been
influenced by the legal traditions and the model of central bank of the country
under study.
According to the Eurobarometer results, in 1999 the countries which were more
favourable to the introduction of the ECB were The Netherlands (85% of
favour) and Ireland (77%). On the other side, UK (44%), Spain (62%), Greece
and Denmark (64%) expressed their disagreement. The preference expressed by
The Netherlands is to be considered as normal, given that the Dutch central bank
is traditionally highly independent, at least de facto. It is true that Art. 28 of the
Dutch central bank established a mechanism of instructions from the
government to the central bank, but this provision has never been used. Its
                                                          
81 The results of the Eurobarometer can be seen at the following address:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg10/epo/eb/eb52/eb52_ann.pdf. These percentages are presented
existence (and the theoretical possibility of its use) has instead been the source
of a dialogue between the bank and the political institutions. Another crucial
factor for the success of the ECB in this country is Mr. Duisenberg, the current
President of the ECB, being the former President of the Dutch central bank.
Similarly comprehensible, although for opposite reasons, is the behaviour of
UK, Greece, Spain, Austria and Portugal, that before the reforms were used to
central banks subservient to the political powers. Less direct is the link between
the high support of the ECB and the legal traditions in central banking of
Belgium and Italy (both 74% in favour); this appreciation can perhaps be
justified on the basis of the widespread acceptance shown by these two States
towards the euro. The favourable position of Sweden towards the ECB can also
give rise to some perplexities. Sweden is not only one of the more convinced
anti-euro countries of Europe, but the Riksbank, the oldest central bank in the
world, has also traditionally been under the control of Parliament.
The Eurobarometer data on the accountability of the ECB to the European
Parliament can perhaps shed light on some controversial points. Following the
Eurobarometer report, the States are more likely to trust an accountable ECB if
their correspondent model of central bank provides mechanisms of
accountability through political oversight. This is the case of Finland, Sweden
and Denmark. The example of Sweden is especially relevant, as its support for
the ECB can be justified only if this latter is accountable to the European
Parliament (the support of the Swedish public opinion for this kind of
accountability being significantly high). France shows the highest support for an
accountable central bank; this enthusiasm can perhaps be interpreted more as a
will to contrast a German-like independent institution than as a real trust in
parliamentary controls, given the secondary role exercised traditionally by
Parliament vis-à-vis the Bank of France if compared to the Government. At the
                                                                                                                                                                                    
in the Annex of Eurobarometer 52 / Eurobaromètre 52. It takes into accounts data for the
period October-November 1999 and has been released in April 2000.
opposite level (low degree of acceptance) we can find UK (only 59% of public
opinion in favour of an accountable ECB) followed at a distance by Portugal
(69%), Germany and Spain (73%). The distrust (or, maybe, lack of interest) in
an accountable central bank conforms with the Portuguese and German
traditions of central banking, as their central institutions have been exempted
from significant forms of accountability; more peculiar is the case of Spain as
the Bank of Spain, as already seen, is subject to relevant controls vis-à-vis
Parliament and Government. This situation can maybe be explained with
reference to a possible separation between the political will and the opinion of
the public at large.
It is now time to draw some conclusions on the relationship between, on one
side, the legal status of the national central banks as described in the National
Reports and, on the other side, the national preferences on the euro and the ECB
(and its character of accountability) expressed by the public opinion and
summarised so far.
Firstly, the data described above can be interpreted as a sign of the uniqueness of
the situation of UK; as a matter of fact the opinion expressed by the public and
its distrust for the euro, EMU and all its accessories has no relation with the
current status of the Bank of England and the English legal traditions. The
majority of the English opinion is simply opposed to the European integration
process as a whole.
Secondly, the public opinion on the ECB registered in others countries is largely
a reflection of the country-specific legal and economic central banking
traditions. At least this is clearly the case for Spain, Greece, Austria and
Portugal. More surprising is the support in favour of the ECB registered in Italy,
Belgium and France: in these countries the public opinion shows a great interest
in this kind of institution notwithstanding its unfamiliar features. The position of
Sweden is also not well-defined, as the Swedish public opinion is of the view
that the euro is not to be trusted (only 43% of support) but at the same time
indicates its preference for the ECB at the condition (however) that it should be
accountable.
Finally, the percentages on the accountability of the ECB described above seem
to confirm the direct relationship between the preferences of the national public
opinion and the legal/economic traditions of central banking of the country. The
only controversial case remains that of France, as it highly supports a
parliamentary accountable ECB despite the model of responsibility proposed
does not fully conform to it.
Conclusions
The third stage of the European Monetary Union is to be considered as a
transitional and final phase, designed for the smooth introduction of the euro and
intended to enable the States to prepare their economic and legal framework.
The new currency, which, from January 1, 1999 has been existing only as
scriptural money, will start to circulate in cash form from January 1, 2002.
During this period, the States are called to introduce modifications in their legal
order. It is true that the legal reforms related to the status of the national central
banks entered into force well before the 1st of January 1999, as they were
considered the prerequisites for the States to accede to EMU. However, such
reforms neither followed the same patterns nor reached a complete
homogeneity: harmonisation is not necessary in this field. This is probably also
the reason why the discussion on the euro and EMU has been livelier in the
outer countries than in the participating ones.
Different solutions have however been adopted by the States member of EMU for
the introduction of the euro into the internal order whenever the EC legislation,
based mainly on Regulations No. 1103/1997 and No. 974/1998, either granted
them some scope of discretion, or did not regulate the matter, or regulated it
through soft law, for example with recommendations.
The States in such process of adaptation have used different legal approaches.
Some States have considered the introduction of the euro as a reason for
changing all the internal provisions in contradiction with the EC principles on
the euro, some others have drafted internal acts reproducing literally the words
of the EC regulations on the euro (including or not some modifications), and
others have simply make reference to the EC acts without restating them.
Finally, the States still have different preferences toward the concepts of
independence and accountability of the central bank according (partially) to their
legal traditions on central banking, even though the major divergence consist in
the acceptance/refusal of the euro per se, and not on the configuration of the
ECB.
